English
The explanation of the discourse on the result of old age and death is finished. 10. Explanation of the discourse on "result is a phenomenon with the nature of results." 501. With the intention that "result, being a condition for result, is a reciprocal condition," it says, "the result of which result is a reciprocal condition." From the statement beginning "and referring to the arising of another result due to that condition," it can be understood as a strong supporting condition for birth, old age, death, etc. By "by the former declaration," it means by the declaration "result is a phenomenon with the nature of results." By "of this challenge," it means of the challenge that proceeds with "and result and a phenomenon with the nature of results." The explanation of the discourse on "result is a phenomenon with the nature of results" is finished. The explanation of the Seventh Chapter is finished. 8. The Eighth Chapter 1. Explanation of the discourse on the six destinations. 503-504. "Color-radiance" means that color itself shines forth in the manner of blue, etc., meaning the color-base. Form is long, etc. The explanation of the discourse on the six destinations is finished. 2. Explanation of the discourse on the intermediate existence. 505. By "intermediate places," it means intervening places. Because of going through the air, breaking through obstructing places. By "if that were not between existences," it means if that intermediate existence were not between existences like the sense-sphere existence, etc. By "there is no such thing as intermediate existence," there is no reason to reject the statement of one's own school that "absolutely there is no such thing as intermediate existence," it does not reject it by keeping the reason for its rejection in mind, but rather thus not wishing, he rejects it merely by his view. 506. 'Birth' means 'does not wish', this is the connection. 507. Thus, he does not wish for it there, just as in realms of sensual pleasure, he does not wish for that succession of decease and rebirth in the state of an intermediate existence. For he wishes for its occurrence only from the karma that produces existence and becoming; therefore, from impermanence, how can there be a succession of birth, old age, and death? And this view is stated for some of those who hold the intermediate existence view. Those who say, "in a short time, in just seven days, one attains rebirth," and those who say, "having deceased right there, one comes forth, in seven sevens," by them, the succession of decease and rebirth is indeed acknowledged, and they should be considered modern, as it is stated in the Pāli, "Do beings in an intermediate existence arise, age, die, decease, and reappear? It should not be said so." And just as this is so, so too do modern people acknowledge the state of going to hell, etc. Thus they say, "the one in hell has feet upwards," and so on. To show what the opponent relies on to conceive of an intermediate existence, it is said in the commentary, "having wrongly grasped the Sutta phrase 'one who attains Nibbāna in the interim'." For the meaning of this Sutta phrase, "one who attains Nibbāna in the interim," is that in the Avihas and so on, without exceeding the middle of the lifespan there, one attains Nibbāna by reaching the highest path in the interim, by the complete extinguishing of defilements, not that one is an intermediate being. Therefore, it is said, "having wrongly grasped the Sutta phrase 'one who attains Nibbāna in the interim'." But those who say, "according to the saying 'one seeking existence', there is indeed an intermediate existence. For he seeks existence, rebirth, therefore he is 'one seeking existence'," they are those who, being already existent, will not exist again, those who have destroyed their defilements, who are called "existent" in "for the stability of existent beings." Those who seek existence due to being devoid of that are "seekers of existence," trainees and ordinary people due to not having abandoned the fetter of becoming. Or, among the four wombs, egg-born and womb-born beings, as long as they are in the eggshell and the womb-sac, they do not Until they break forth, they are called 'sambhavesī'. Having emerged from the egg-sac or womb-sac, they are called 'bhūtā'. Those born from moisture and apparitional beings, at the first mind-moment, are called 'sambhavesī'. From the second mind-moment onwards, they are called 'bhūtā'. Or by whatever posture they are born, until they attain another, they are called 'sambhavesī'. After that, they are called 'bhūtā'. When there is such a straightforward meaning, consistent with the Pāli, what is the purpose of conceiving an intermediate existence, a desired, undetermined state of being? It should be rejected. But some say: "The uninterrupted appearance of phenomena, occurring in a continuum, in different places, is observed. Just as in the continuum of non-conscious things, like rice and so on, so too in the continuum of conscious beings, there must be an uninterrupted appearance in different places. And this principle is applicable if there is an intermediate existence, not otherwise." This reasoning they give. To them, concerning one with psychic power, who has mastered the mind, who can project a mind-made body, appearing here from the Brahma-world in an instant, or going to the Brahma-world from here, the reasoning should be stated. If the occurrence of phenomena in a disconnected place is not desired everywhere, even if it be said, "The sphere of psychic power of those with psychic power is inconceivable," that is equally applicable here by the saying, "The result of kamma is inconceivable." Therefore, that is merely their opinion. Indeed, phenomena by nature are inconceivable. They appear in disconnected places due to conditions in some cases, and in uninterrupted places in others. Just as, by conditions like the sound of a voice, in another place, like a mirror or a mountain region, the arising of reflections, echoes, and so on, is observed. Here it is said: "A reflection, first of all, is not an example, due to its non-establishment and dissimilarity. For the notion that a reflection is a distinct, separate form arising, this is not established. Even if established, due to dissimilarity, it would not be an example, because two forms do not exist together in one place. For where the form of the mirror and the form of the reflection are seen, the co-existence of two forms in one place is not appropriate, relying on..." from a non-existent place, and this is an unequal connection. For the appearance in another place, without interruption, is not said to be a connection referring to the connection of a mirror, which is the connection of the reflection of a face, not a non-continuum, so it is unequal. Here, what was said: "A reflection is another form that arises, and this is unproven due to the co-existence of two in one place," this is an unequal co-existence that is challenged, because their bases are distinct. For there is no co-existence of things with distinct bases. Just as the light-form of many gems, lamps, etc., appearing in one place, due to its purity and continuity, appears as if it were an undivided place, but due to having distinct bases, it is indeed a distinct place; it is only an undivided place in terms of the manner of apprehension. Similarly, it should be understood in the case of mirror-form and reflection-form. For by the combination of such conditions, it arises there and ceases there, and this should be accepted because it becomes an object for eye-consciousness. Otherwise, it would be perceived even without light, or it would not be an object for eye-consciousness. But that power belongs to its combination, that such a seeing occurs. For the difference in the power of phenomena is inconceivable, and by saying this, this very meaning is proven, that even what has a distinct base appears as if it has an undivided place. By this, the objection that there are no reflection-forms in water, etc., should be understood as refuted. And when the reflection-form is established, its illustrative nature is established, because it demonstrates the spatially separated nature of causes and effects. But what was said: "It is not an illustration because it is dissimilar," that is inappropriate. Why? For an illustration is not always similar to what is illustrated. The intention here is that for the purpose of proving the meaning that the aggregates of rebirth appear in a spatially separated place from the aggregates of death, a reflection-form, which is its fruit, arises in a place spatially separated from the face-form, thus implying its illustrative meaning. By this, the non-existence The urging of craving should be understood as rejected. And because the cause-and-effect relationship of mirror images is established, therefore too is it rejected. For the continuity of speech is in the connections of cause and effect. The image arises from the original and from the mirror due to the two causes mentioned, but the arising of rebirth aggregates is not in a disconnected place. Just as the mirror image is illustrated here, so too should echoes, lamps, seals, etc., be illustrated. For just as echoes, lamps, seals, etc., are caused by sounds, etc., and arise without coming from elsewhere, even so is this mind. Moreover, this advocate of an intermediate existence should be asked thus: If an intermediate existence is conceived because "the arising of phenomena in a disconnected place is not suitable," how is the arising of body-consciousness and mind-consciousness in the foot-region and heart-region of Rahu and others' bodies, separated by many thousands of leagues, suitable in a disconnected place? If it is due to being of one continuum, it is similar here too. And it is not sufficient to explain this away by saying they are formless phenomena,