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comprehend many knowable phenomena. But the teaching of the truths is excluded here because of its extremely concise nature. "Lifeless" and so on, is said having made the element-teaching specifically for the purpose of illuminating the emptiness of beings and so on. The former method is said with the intention that it is possible for other elements that occur in sequence, and so the second method is said with "or just the mind-element" and so on. There, even when there is no preceding or succeeding state, by way of the intention of preceding or succeeding. even in the mind-element, it is said to be seen as preceding and following, just by being immediately prior and immediately posterior. By "being unable to arise without grasping something else," the view that consciousness is exclusively object-dependent is shown, thereby refuting the consciousness-only doctrine which holds that "the mind arises by itself as a blue or other appearance, without an object." 184. "Of one and many continua" is to be construed as: "of doors belonging to one continuum, to an undifferentiated continuum, and of objects belonging to many continua, to differentiated continua." "Of one and many kinds" means: of doors, being of one kind, like the eye; of objects, being of many kinds, like blue. The eye, etc., even if one, is a condition for consciousness, but form, etc., is always many, combined. To show this specific meaning, a difference in wording is made for eye-form, etc. What then is the reason that the eye, etc., even if one, is a condition for consciousness, but form, etc., is always many? Due to the specific nature of their conditionality. For the eye, being a condition for eye-consciousness through the conditions of support, pre-arisen, faculty, and dissociated, exists by its mere existence; when it exists, that exists; when it does not exist, that does not exist. Therefore, it is said to be a condition through the existent and unvanished conditions. And its dependence on it is not to be understood as adhering in one part, due to its immaterial nature, but rather as being dependent for its existence, like students, royal officials, etc., on a teacher, king, etc. And the other conditions are to be understood by their respective distinctions. This conditionality is not possible in a single thing. Thus, to show that even one eye is a condition for eye-consciousness, the Pāli text uses the singular "dependent on the eye." Form, however, although it is a condition through pre-arisen, existent, and unvanished conditions, like the eye, by having arisen earlier and being helpful at the moment of its existence, nevertheless, it is always many, combined, that becomes a condition, due to its nature as an object. For whatever conditioned phenomenon, whether of intrinsic nature or merely a conceptualized aspect, consciousness perceives. It proceeds by making something manifest. When other conditions are present, it is called an object (ārammaṇa) because it is that which is to be leaned upon, being the cause of its proceeding by leaning, since consciousness, by its nature of having an object, is unable to proceed without leaning on anything. Because the object condition is obtained by consciousness in accordance with the nature of the object as it is perceived, the eye-consciousness, proceeding by apprehending form, proceeds by making that nature manifest. And for this consciousness, whose activity is dependent on the sense faculty, the perception of the nature of the object does not occur merely by one or two vanished atoms of color, nor by a few atoms of color, but rather by the color that has come into the range of apprehension, in accordance with the attention. Thus, the Blessed One, showing that many forms, acting collectively, are a condition for consciousness, indicated it with the plural ‘‘and in forms.’’ But what is meant by what is said: ‘‘The form base is a condition, by way of object condition, for the eye-consciousness element and the states associated with it’’? That too is said with reference to the kind of form base that is an object condition for eye-consciousness. What kind is it then? It is a collection. This meaning is clear. And having done so, what some say, ‘‘Eye-consciousness and the like are objects of apprehension by way of apprehending the base, not by way of apprehending the substance,’’ is indeed correct. And here, the collectivity of the object should not be suspected, because there is no apprehension of a collection; but the collected color-states are object conditions. But how can those that are individually incapable become objects when collected? For blind people, unable to see individually, do not see when collected. This is not absolute, as it is seen that those who are individually incapable are capable in carrying a palanquin and so on. And for hairs and the like, in a place where their individual color cannot be apprehended, it can be apprehended when they are collected in that very place. Thus, their collective action is even more evident. By this, whether the eye-consciousness has an atomic form as its object, or a collection of them, and so on. This objection should be understood as rejected. Even in "depending on ear and sound," etc., this is the same principle. Thus, the meaning is obtained: By the word "also" in "also with mind-element," not only the mind-consciousness element ending in javana is included, but also that which is called bhavaṅga with that object is included. Thus, this meaning is obtained, this meaning is possible. This being so, when there is such a showing of mind-consciousness element for the cittas that arise below the arising of other mind-elements. Even though mind arises, there is no possibility of the mind-element being a mind-consciousness element, because its own nature is designated as the mind-consciousness element. Now that very meaning is made clearer by "five consciousness-elements and mind-element," etc. By its distinct nature, by a nature dissimilar to the five consciousness-elements. And by its place of origin, by the place of arising delimited by the mind-element, functional mind-consciousness element, etc. Now, even without grasping unity, to show the possibility of the meaning as stated, "even when not brought near," etc., is said. There, by way of commonality, by way of similarity. That refers to the citta arising immediately after bhavaṅga. Because the state of not being a mind-consciousness element is not established, because the state of being a mind-element is not established. Indeed, this statement: "a citta arises immediately after the arising and ceasing of a mind-consciousness element...etc....that mind-consciousness element" does not establish the mind-element nature of the citta arising immediately after bhavaṅga. If the mind-element nature were established, then it would be its refuter; this is the intention. But a statement indicating the mind-consciousness element nature of a citta that has arisen from a mind-consciousness element would indicate the mind-consciousness element nature even for such a mind-element. How could it be its refuter? (Therefore) it is said: "Indeed, that which is objected to, that itself is not the refutation." If so, the five-door adverting would indeed become a mind-consciousness element. Bearing this objection in mind, it is said: "also with mind-element," etc. From the five consciousnesses, the mind-d... distinguished from the aggregates is the nature of the five consciousnesses… …nature, by its power. “Of cutting off, rebirth, and life-continuum” means that even the object of these is included within the life-continuum. Or “of the end of impulsion” means that because it is the object of impulsion, even its object is to be understood as included. Therefore it is said: “or by the thoughts of the six doors,” and so on. It is proper to make it distinct. Although advertence also has forms and so on as its object, it does not experience the taste of the object like impulsion does. Therefore, in such a place, it must be made distinct. And the word “and mind” is not for combining, as in “depending on the mind,” and so on, but should be understood as for distinction. The commentary on the Abhidhamma analysis is finished. 3. Commentary on the Questioner “Because of the method stated below” means that when the limited object, and so on, of the mind-element and mind-consciousness-element is shown, as in “for one who is attached to fifty-five sensuous states by taking them as object,” (VibhA. 150; 168) it is because that meaning is stated in the commentary on the analysis of aggregates, and so on, as in “making each aggregate a single phenomenon by way of the arising of thought and form.” (VibhMūlaṭī. 150) The commentary on the Questioner is finished. The commentary on the Analysis of Elements is finished. 4. Analysis of Truths 1. Commentary on the Suttanta Analysis Commentary on the Summary 189. There is nothing apart from the truths, because it proceeds by showing the causes of occurrence, cessation, and both. “It proceeds in the truths” means it proceeds in the truths as objects. For teaching is concerned with the meaning to be taught. “It proceeds in these” means it proceeds in these noble truths by accomplishing the tasks of full understanding, and so on. To make it clearer that the meaning-nature stated as “called virtue, concentration, and wisdom” is taken as the agent of the action of proceeding, it asks, “What proceeds?” “By that designation” means by that conventional expression. By this, it shows that the meaning-nature is the teaching in the ultimate sense, and the nature of words is in the conventional sense. “Having that nature” means having the nature of suffering, and so on. “Having that nature of non-delusion” means having the actual nature of affliction, and so on. “Devoid of other characteristics” means non-affliction. They are distinct in their non-abiding nature.