English
Therefore, it is said in the commentary: "And this moment-limitation of the one born of consciousness... and so on... this same moment-limitation applies to what is born of kamma and so on." By these: the Yamaka recitation as it was brought, "the bodily constructor is born of consciousness" and so on, this is the commentary's statement, by these. There is no explanation of single arising and single cessation, this is the intention. For it is said: "with which consciousness it arises, from that point onwards, it ceases with the seventeenth," and so on. Again, by "by these," it should be understood that the commentary's statements, which proceed by way of explaining single arising and various cessations, and non-arising and single cessation, are taken. Or, in both cases, it means by these teachers. The third part, therefore, the additional sixteen consciousness-moments' lifespan is said to be the third... and so on... lifespan, this is the connection. And by "the third part," the moment of dissolution is intended, taking the moments of arising and standing. In which eleven consciousness-moments have passed, in the remaining five consciousness-moments' lifespan, in which fifteen consciousness-moments have passed, the remaining single consciousness-moment. It should be connected to that very object. And both of these, respectively, are to be understood as having come into range at the mind-door and the five sense-doors. However, it is not possible to understand it thus, referring to an object that has passed beyond one mind-moment, as stated in the Paṭiccasamuppādavibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā (VibhA. 227), showing that "it is not possible," and so on, it is said. "Fifteen" means that more than fifteen mind-moments have passed; this is the connection. By "therefore," and so on, it shows that it is not possible to say that a part of a moment is not grasped. Thus, it is shown that material form does not last for seventeen mind-moments, nor for sixteen mind-moments plus a third part, but indeed lasts for sixteen mind-moments. Why is it that here, even though impermanent and conditioned, material form alone is long-lived? Because of its slow change. Immaterial phenomena, being with an object, are preceded by consciousness. They arise according to their power, by way of manifesting their object, and thus, immediately after the accomplishment of that purpose, they cease, being swift in change. Therefore, the Blessed One said: "Monks, I do not see any other single phenomenon that changes so swiftly, as does, monks, the mind." (AN 1.48) Material phenomena, however, are without an object. They must be manifested by immaterial phenomena by way of an object. And this manifestation of theirs, suitable for conventional usage, is accomplished by sixteen or seventeen mind-moments, due to their own slow change and the swift change of the immaterial phenomena. Thus, material form alone becomes long-lived here. Furthermore, the three aggregates (feeling, perception, formations) are swift in change because their existence depends solely on the continuity of swiftly cognized objects. And consciousness is swift in change because it is merely the apprehension of an object. But material form is slow in change because of its dependence on the slow-changing great elements. Only the Tathāgata has knowledge as it truly is regarding the various elements. And by him, material form alone is said to be a pre-nascent condition, and a post-nascent condition for itself. Therefore, here, material and immaterial phenomena should not be conceived as having the same lifespan based on their common characteristic of being impermanent and conditioned. Indeed. By the method stated, it must be concluded here that only matter is long-lived. And just as matter does not have a lifespan of seventeen thought-moments, or a lifespan of more than sixteen and a third thought-moments, having shown that, and denying the very static moment of consciousness, which is stated in the commentary as the arising of matter in the static moment of consciousness, saying "whatever here... etc.... should be investigated," he then quotes the Pāli passage beginning with the 'arisen and arising' section in the Yamaka, saying "in the Yamaka of consciousness," and so on. There, "in a complete answer" means in an answer given without omitting either of the Yamaka terms. "At the moment of arising and future" means that consciousness at the moment of arising, and future consciousness, is not ceased, but is ceasing. "It shows the absence of a static moment for consciousness" means that the non-mention of "static moment" in the sections like 'arisen and arising' reveals and clarifies this meaning: that there is no such thing as a static moment for consciousness. For, the intention is that no reason is seen for omitting what is found in the Abhidhamma, in accordance with the teaching of the Dhamma. Not only is the non-mention in the Abhidhamma indicative of the absence of a static moment for consciousness, but also the Suttanta Pāli itself; showing this, he says "even in the Suttas," and so on. There, "alteration" means a distinction between before and after. "Static, comprising two moments" refers to the static nature of the present. But alteration should be understood only in the continuum. And here some say: "Does a phenomenon, just as it arises, break up in the same way, or in an altered way? If it breaks up in the same way, there is no possibility of aging. If it is altered, then it is another phenomenon. Thus, in every way, there is only the absence of a static moment." There, even though arising and ceasing share a single phenomenal basis, the moment of arising is one thing, and the moment of ceasing is another. For, the moment of arising is based on the state of arising, and the moment of ceasing is based on the state of ceasing. And the state of ceasing is distinct from the state of arising, as should be desired in a single intrinsic phenomenon; otherwise, one phenomenon arises, and another phenomenon... should decay, so too, in the state of cessation, or in the state approaching cessation, it must be so. That stability and decay must be accepted. If so, why is the moment of stability not mentioned in the Pāli? It should be understood that the Pāli proceeds by way of showing the method, in accordance with the disposition of those to be trained. For even Abhidhamma teaching sometimes occurs in accordance with the disposition of those to be trained. Thus, the arising of form is taught by distinguishing it as "accumulation and continuity." The teaching of the pairs connected with cause, etc., should be illustrated here. "Or of whom" and so on is the question. Its answer is "no." That the origin-truth ceases refers to the moment of cessation of a thought-occurrence. The intention here is this: if form were to arise at the moment of a thought's dissolution, it would be suffering-truth, and it would not be possible to say "no," yet it is said. Therefore, it is understood that "there is no arising of form at the moment of a thought's cessation." But this is not the reason. For it is possible to say "no" referring to the formless realm, or to form arisen from thought. For this is the nature of the Yamaka teaching, namely, interpretation according to possibility. By this, the statement "and not only form arisen from thought" and so on, should be understood as refuted. Alternatively, by the principle of proximity, that origin-truth which ceases, the suffering-truth that is to be produced by it, which is called form connected with thought and mental factors, its arising at that time does not exist, and so the answer is "no," not for all. Because of the statement of co-arising and single cessation: "If the bodily formation ceases for someone, does the mental formation cease for them? Yes." (Yamaka 2. Saṅkhārayamaka.79) Thus, because of the statement of co-arising and co-cessation. By that statement: by the statement "If the bodily formation" and so on. Of other forms: of forms born of kamma, temperature, and nutriment. Of co-arising, co-cessation, and so on: the interpretation here is this— of those born of kamma, etc., whose co-arising and co-cessation are not refuted, whose non-arising is not permitted, whose diverse cessation is not prevented, whose unconditioned state is not obstructed. By this, "whose" "Wholesome states arise" and so on, by this text (Yama. 3. Dhammayamaka. 163), and by the logical statement, "not merely mind-originated form." Regarding the recollection of the Yamaka Pāḷi: when there is recollection in the manner stated of the mind-yamaka Pāḷi, just as it is heard. Regarding breaking up: the breaking up of the mind is indeed its ceasing, due to the absence of duration. It does not even go to a state of companionship, due to the absence of a causal state, such as a state of support. Indeed, at the moment of arising, the mind is strong by obtaining proximate and other conditions. And if this is so: and if by temperature also, form is produced at the very moment of the arising of the life-continuum mind. "At that mind-moment": at the moment of that mind, meaning, at both moments. "By that very reason": by its very swift changing nature. Or "by that very reason": by the slow changing nature of form, its entire arising is within one mind-moment. That is the mind. The rebirth-linking mind, like associated states, is a condition for co-arisen form-states by co-arisen and other conditions. Thus it is said, "after rebirth-linking." It is said that mind is indeed a co-arisen and other condition for mind-originated things, "for non-mind-originated things." "Immediately after that": immediately after the mind with which it co-arises. That is form. "The mind immediately after that": the mind immediately after the co-arisen mind. "If so": if form arises throughout the entire mind-moment, and the arising of form begins at the very moment of the mind's arising,