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for advertence and impulsion in any place other than the undesirable path-and-fruit process. And the preliminary work, having a present object, is established as a repetition condition for mind-penetrating knowledge with a present object. And the past-related is likewise not distinct. Otherwise, if "present" here were said to mean "present in continuity" and "present in time," then past and future would also become present. And if that were so, it would have to be said: "A present phenomenon is a condition by immediate contiguity for a present phenomenon," and so on. But that is not stated. However, from such statements as: "A past phenomenon is a condition by immediate contiguity for a present phenomenon. Former, former past aggregates are by immediate contiguity for later, later present aggregates... ...and so on, up to the adaptation and lineage-change" (Paṭṭhāna 2.18.5), the immediately past four aggregates are understood as past only in terms of present in time and continuity. And the meaning of the word "present" as "present in time and continuity," as it appears in the Abhidhamma matrix, is nowhere stated in the Pāli canon. Therefore, by them, due to the mind's arising in a single moment for both the psychic person and the other, the present-object nature of mind-penetrating knowledge is stated. But when one makes the resolve: "I know the mind that has arisen in this person. I will know what will arise," or having made such a resolve, performs the attainments of the base-jhana and so on, then the advertence, the preliminary work, and the mind-penetrating knowledge all have past and future objects, because the distinction is made by advertence itself. But those who say: "The psychic person, desiring to know another's mind, adverts. The advertence, having a momentary present object, ceases together with it. Then follow four or five impulsions. Of these, the last is the psychic mind, the rest are sense-sphere. For all of them, that same ceased mind is the object..." is not one object, nor are they different objects, because they are certainly present objects.” Relying on this statement, some say: “Just as there is no difference in objects for adverting and javana, even though their objects are present or past, so too, when cittas are adverted to that are one, two, three, four, or five citta-moments in the future, even if adverting and javana have future, present, or past objects as is possible, there would be no difference in objects. Therefore, when a citta four or five moments in the future is adverted to, after the preliminary work on a future object, the mind-penetrating knowledge that has a momentary present object is established.” Their view is not established, because the questions “Is a future object a condition for a present object by way of repetition?” and “Is a present object a condition for a past object by way of repetition?” are not raised, and because in the enumeration it is stated “three in repetition.” For there is no wholesome or functional exalted state that is not repetition. And the basis for this view is not established for the statement that adverting and javana have momentary present and ceased objects, because that statement was made precisely with reference to adverting having a future object when no distinction is made between what has occurred and what will occur, and due to its absence, javana also not having a present object. For then, immediately after the bhavanga vibrates, adverting occurs with respect to the citta that has just become manifest. If the knowing citta also had a present object, due to the fault of adverting and knowing cittas occurring together, and due to the fault of adverting and javana having different objects in the undesirable case of adverting and knowing being attained or not attained in the penetration of a part of a heap, what was said, “a momentary present citta is the object of mind-penetrating knowledge,” is inappropriate. Rejecting this, and seeing that there is no difference in objects due to having a present object in terms of time-continuum, precisely at the time when the aforementioned faults do not arise, it is said that adverting and javana have present and ceased objects. That too, The statement of the former speaker they would not approve. For if that were so, then, just as in "attention to wholesome things" and so on, due to the immediate condition being established for what is included in another term, it would have to be said: "Attention with a present object is a condition for aggregates with past objects by way of immediate condition," but it is not said. But why is the present-object nature of the knowledge of others' minds thus investigated? Is it not the case that in the analyses of "a past phenomenon is a condition for a present phenomenon, a future phenomenon is a condition for a present phenomenon, by way of object condition," it is said: "Past aggregates are a condition for the knowledge of psychic powers, the knowledge of others' minds, the knowledge of past lives, the knowledge of beings' destinies according to their karma, and attention, by way of object condition" (Paṭṭhāna 2.18.2), and "Future aggregates are a condition for the knowledge of psychic powers, the knowledge of others' minds, the knowledge of future events, and attention, by way of object condition" (Paṭṭhāna 2.17.3-4), and in the 'arisen' triad, "Unarisen aggregates, aggregates that are arising, are a condition for the knowledge of psychic powers, the knowledge of others' minds, the knowledge of future events, and attention, by way of object condition," with the inclusion of the knowledge of others' minds? But in the analysis of "a present phenomenon for a present phenomenon," it is said: "Present aggregates are a condition for the knowledge of psychic powers and attention, by way of object condition" (Paṭṭhāna 2.18.3), and in the 'arisen' triad, "Arisen aggregates are a condition for the knowledge of psychic powers and attention, by way of object condition" (Paṭṭhāna 2.17.2) – only this much is stated. From this, it is understood that "the knowledge of others' minds does not operate on present minds." For if it were to operate, the inclusion of the knowledge of others' minds would have to be made in these cases too, just as in the former ones, would it not? It is true, it should be included. But it is understood from another Pāli text that this is abbreviated by way of showing the method. "A phenomenon with a past object is a condition for a phenomenon with a present object, by way of object condition" (Paṭṭhāna 2.19.20), "a phenomenon with a future object for a phenomenon with a present object." "A phenomenon with a present object for a..." of a present object.” Indeed, in the analyses of these, it is said: “By the knowledge of discerning minds, one knows the mind of one endowed with a present mind that has a past object. The present aggregates, which have a past object, are a condition by way of object for the advertence of the knowledge of discerning minds.” “By the knowledge of discerning minds, one knows the mind of one endowed with a present mind that has a future object… By the knowledge of discerning minds, one knows the mind of one endowed with a present mind that has a present object. The present aggregates, which have a present object, are a condition by way of object for the advertence of the knowledge of discerning minds.” Thus, it is stated that the knowledge of discerning minds operates on a present object. Therefore, it should be understood that this investigation was made. “Of these” (tesaṃ) is a genitive of specification, meaning “among those two knowledges.” “Wholesome aggregates” (kusalā khandhā) is a plural designation referring to the knowledges of psychic powers, recollection of past lives, and knowledge of future events, not referring to the knowledge of discerning minds or the knowledge of knowing the destiny of deeds. If it is asked whether the four aggregates being the object of these is not established? No, because it is stated elsewhere: “The aggregates that are without applied thought and only with sustained thought, and sustained thought, are a condition by way of object for the knowledge of discerning minds, the knowledge of recollection of past lives, and the knowledge of future events, for their advertence.” And: “The aggregates that are with applied thought and with sustained thought, and applied thought, are a condition by way of object for the knowledge of discerning minds, the knowledge of recollection of past lives, and the knowledge of future events, for their advertence.” From this, the meaning is established that the plural designation also refers to the knowledge of discerning minds. Even so, for the knowledge of knowing the destiny of deeds, since it is not mentioned in phrases like “the aggregates that are without applied thought and only with sustained thought, and sustained thought,” the four aggregates being its object is not established? No, because its non-mention there has another reason. Indeed, by the knowledge of knowing the destiny of deeds, the four aggregates associated with kamma are grasped primarily by kamma. For just as the knowledge of discerning minds distinguishes a mind into divisions like with applied thought, etc., and divisions like with greed, etc., by means of prior preparation, it does not distinguish it in such a divided way. but it reveals the origin only through the action, thus in the divisions like “the aggregates are only without initial application and sustained application, and sustained application,” it is not stated, nor is it an object of the four aggregates. This, however, is the reason for not stating it. Some, even there, read thus: “of the knowledge of past lives, of the knowledge of actions and their results, of the knowledge of future events.” For it is not unable to reveal action with a division like initial application,