English
Nor would there be the grasping of a convention, if the convention were a designation, saying, "This is the meaning of this spoken word," or, "This word illuminates this meaning." But merely in the arising of perception, in the grasping of a convention, there is no purpose in assuming a word separated from its meaning. "The discourse of the Blessed Buddha is understood by the worldly ear," "Do you know, Ananda, if you have heard such a name before, namely Janavasabha?" "And he makes known the name: 'I am Koṇḍañña, O Blessed One'," and so on. and the word-state of designation is established. Therefore, the meaning which is not contradictory to the Pāli canon and the commentaries should be considered and accepted. If beings and so forth are not non-existent designations, what then is a non-existent designation? This meaning has been explained as: “The reckoning of non-existent beings and so forth… …the expression is a non-existent designation.” And since beings and so forth are non-existent, their existence should not be spoken of. And those who would say: “Non-existence is spoken of because they are non-existent, like material form and so forth, not because they do not exist,” this argument is refuted in the discourse on existence. Nor is it that if material form is not feeling, it is therefore non-existent. Similarly, if beings and so forth exist, they should not be called non-existent because they are not material forms and so forth. But since, when material forms and so forth, and sense organs and so forth, are occurring in various ways, diverse perceptions such as “a being, a woman, a chariot, a pot” arise, and expressions conformable to these perceptions, and there is no other existing verbal meaning supported by the perception of a being, a chariot, etc., apart from these material forms, sense organs, etc., therefore, the expressions for a being, a chariot, etc., are called “non-existent designations.” And they are not called “false” because they operate by way of common worldly convention. For this very reason, these expressions are called “conventional truth.” And that verbal meaning, though itself non-existent, obtains the usage of designation by way of an existing word, and is called “conventional truth” because it is a verbal meaning operating by way of perceptions that have been grasped. And it is understood that the statement “conventional knowledge has only truth as its object, not any other object” (Kathā. 434) is said with this very intention: “earth kasina and so forth, and robes and so forth, are conventional truth.” Since, when material forms and so forth are occurring in a continuum, the apprehension of a being and so forth, which occurs without abandoning them by way of grasping unity, grasps a non-existent being, chariot, etc., which is not present in those aggregates, material forms, sense organs, etc., just like eye-consciousness and so forth in material forms and so forth, therefore, it is said that it does not operate by way of having a limited object and so forth. Similarly, that aggregate Taking as a basis the non-collection, non-continuum, grasped as a unity, the designation and convention “a good friend, a bad friend, a person” come to be. Because of that, for one who associates with that person-perception, which is the basis for it, wholesome and unwholesome states arise. Thus it is said: “A person is also a condition by way of decisive support condition.” But since there is no such thing as a person, just as the earth element is found by distinguishing it with the mind from the water element and so on, a person is not found by distinguishing them from the aggregates like form and so on. And the view of a person is refuted by the discourse on a person. And by the bhikkhunī Vajirā it was said: “Whom do you conceive as a being, Māra, is it a view of yours? This is a mere heap of formations, no being is found here.” But to show the arising of the word “being” as a convention, she said this: “Just as with a collection of parts the word ‘chariot’ comes to be; Even so, when the aggregates exist, the convention ‘being’ comes to be.” If a person does not exist, how can the grasping of a person be with an object? Because an object is grasped even if it does not exist. For it is said to be with an object because it arises by grasping an imagined object, or one known by worldly convention, or an existing, real object. For the word “with an object” only indicates that mind and mental factors do not arise without an object, not whether the object grasped by them exists or does not exist. This is the determination of those who completely follow the refutation of the existence of anything apart from the conditioned and unconditioned. 1316. By way of naming means that it is by its own nature of naming, without depending on another. For that which names another, and which is dependent on that, is a naming dependent on another, and thus is not a nature of naming. Therefore, the names of the general populace, of relatives, and of qualities, which are the makers of common names and so on, do not become names. Yas And it is named by others, but it has no nature of being named; thus, there is no name-state. But for feeling and the like, because they are established by their own nature, the name-state of feeling and the like is said to be due to their nature of being named. By the example of earth and the like, it only illustrates the name's inherent nature, not the general state of being a name. But because it is established, the word 'name' is used only for formless phenomena, not for earth and the like; thus, they do not have the state of being a name. And in the matrix, the non-applicability of the name-state to earth and the like is already stated. For just as form phenomena are not spoken of collectively by other names like hair and the like, abandoning the name of earth and the like, so too there is no occurrence of formless phenomena being spoken of collectively by other names, abandoning the name of feeling and the like. Or else, form phenomena like eyes and forms are manifest without a name, due to their nature of being illuminator and illuminated; formless phenomena are not so. Thus, like contact of designation, they are called "name" due to their nature of being graspable through a name. Even impingement contact is not manifest without a name like eyes and the like, so it is called "name." Or, due to its formlessness, it is included as having the nature of another name, or as having the nature of another contact. The meaning of the words "it forms, thus form; it names, thus name" is possible here for the latter and the former. "It forms" means it manifests itself even without a name. "It names" means it makes itself manifest by a name, due to its unmanifest nature without a name. Even though form has the nature of an object and dominant condition, it is not a condition in an exceptional way, like Nibbāna which is the supreme solace, by its nature of naming it. Therefore, only Nibbāna is called "name." 1318. "For the purpose of showing the arising of the root of the cycle" means the arising of the root of the cycle for beings is ignorance and craving for existence. That is the meaning of "for the purpose of showing that." There, "arises" means "arising." The root of the cycle itself is the arising, thus "arising of the root of the cycle." By showing the root of the cycle, the occurrence of the roots of the cycle is shown, thus it is also "for the purpose of showing the arising of the roots of the cycle." Meaning. 1320. In each instance, due to the specific ways of grasping "self" and "world," it is said "self and world." It is said "self and world" either in the sense of one who grasps one aggregate as self and another as the world for one's own enjoyment, or in the sense of one who grasps one's own self as "self" and another's self as "world." "That will be" means they are fixed on and grasp that fivefold aggregate, grasped in both ways, as "that will be." 1332. A dhamma to be learned together is a sahadhamma; that which exists there is sahadhammika. Taking the word "āya" from "dovacassa" as not meaning "coming" but as referring to the object of the verb, he says "dubbacassa kamma" (the action of being difficult to admonish) with the intention that "dovacassāyaṃ" means "for the sake of being difficult to admonish." Or, "dovacassāyaṃ" is the course or conduct of being difficult to admonish. "Paṭāṇikagahaṇaṃ" is grasping at a contradictory statement. "Garuvāso" is dwelling with respect towards those who are weighty in qualities. "Sajeṭṭhakavāso" is dwelling with those who are senior by birth and so on, those who should be listened to. Or, the weighty ones are to be feared. The seniors are to be ashamed before. He says "saṅkhārakkhandhoyevā" (it is just the aggregate of formations) because the volition by which one is difficult to admonish is fit to be dovacassatā (difficulty of admonition). 1333. A name associated with the word "du" (bad) is a bad name. He says "bhajanāti upasaṅkamanā" (serving is approaching) with the intention that even for one who does not approach, learning is serving. "Sabbatobhāgena" means in every way, with body, speech, and mind, both openly and secretly. 1336. "Vinayo" refers to what is stated in the Vibhaṅga and Khandhakas. One does not incur an offense before or after the transgression of the basis; therefore, it defines the offense together with its basis. Thus, it says, "saha vatthunā...pe... āpattikusalatā nāmā" (together with the basis...pe... is called skill in offenses). "Saha kammavācāya" means together with the formal declaration (kammavācā), such as the kammavācā for rehabilitation or for spreading a mat, and "Bhante, I have committed such and such an offense." For it is together with the kammavācā that both the emergence from the offense and the offense itself are defined.