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which indicates merely the existence of phenomena without a determined classification, the enumeration is made with the plural number, and so it asks with the plural number: "Which phenomena are unconditioned?" Indeed, the enumeration and the question are made for the sake of one who does not know phenomena in terms of their intrinsic nature, number, classification, and so on. Therefore, they are enumerated and questioned without making a classification. To show that "these" (phenomena) do not extend beyond the unconditioned element, even though it is one, it is referred to and concluded with the plural number, taking into account the time before the explanation, when the one to be instructed was ignorant. 1101. The connection should be made: "What then is not (there)? What was not said by it?" "Only this is cognizable by the mind-consciousness" implies an absence of rule, an absence of determination. Since it is said in the Pāli that "what is cognizable by eye-consciousness and so on is cognizable by the eye and so on," and assuming that what is cognizable by mind-consciousness must also be cognizable by the mind, the commentary says, "What then by mind-consciousness?" and so on. "Cognizable by some, not cognizable by others" – this should be connected by distinguishing the sense-sphere mind-consciousness in terms of its objects and so on. Indeed, sense-sphere phenomena are not cognizable by sense-sphere mind-consciousness whose object is form-sphere and so on, nor by that associated with form-attachment and so on. But they are cognizable by others. In this way, for sense-sphere objects themselves, the non-cognizability and cognizability of some, like sounds, by form-objects and so on, should be connected. Similarly, according to the distinction of doors. Or, the investigating consciousness accompanied by joy is only a desirable object. Therefore, the other (object) is not cognizable by it. ...should be applied everywhere as appropriate, such as to wholesome and unwholesome results accompanied by equanimity. It should be understood that form-realm beings, etc., are not known by the results of sense-sphere actions, etc., but some are known by formless-realm beings, due to their continuity. That it is unknowable by Nibbāna is said with reference to the possibility of the meaning of the phrase "unknowable by some," not because Nibbāna is a continuously existing mind-consciousness. 1102. "Craving for the five sense-pleasures" is said in an emphatic sense. It would be appropriate to say that all greed, except for the defilement of becoming, is the defilement of sense-desire. Craving accompanied by the eternalist view is called "defilement of becoming" in the commentaries because it is associated with the view of becoming. However, the defilement of becoming is said in the Pāḷi to arise only in those dissociated from views. That craving, too, is fit to be the defilement of sense-desire. The defilements of sense-desire, etc., which are causes of suffering in this life and the next, are also stated in two ways. 1103. And in the explanation of the defilement of sense-desire, "in sense-pleasures" can mean the objective sense-pleasures of the three realms, which are the objects of sense-desire, wrong views, etc. For not all craving arising there receives the name of sense-desire, etc. The desire to act arises even in unwholesome states, but not the desire for Dhamma. 1105. The grasping of "another self," although it occurs only in the aggregates of clinging, does not establish itself in form... or in consciousness. Thus, to grasp a self by making it other is the eternalist view. For one who grasps some self, such as Brahmā, as "is" (eternal) and another as "is not" (impermanent), there is the partial eternalist view of "is and is not." For one who, when asked "is?", says "neither," and when asked "is not?", says "no," denying everything, there is the eel-wriggler's view. "Amarā" means unceasing, or it is a view that wriggles like an eel. Having said that craving for the five sense-pleasures is the defilement of sense-desire, it rejects the defilement of sense-desire and the defilement of wrong views in the mansions of Brahmās, etc. If, however, greed is the defilement of sense-desire... is free from the defilement of becoming, when it arises in those free from wrong views, then the defilement of ignorance, connected with it, is said to be free from defilement. Just as with that connected with dejection, doubt, and restlessness, its freedom from defilement should be stated: “Ignorance arising in the four thought-moments connected with greed, and free from wrong views, may be connected with defilement, or may be free from defilement.” And since it is said: “The defilement of sensual desire arises in the eight thought-moments connected with greed,” and “The defilement of wrong view and the defilement of ignorance arise dependent on the defilement of sensual desire” (Paṭṭhāna 3.3.1), it cannot be said that greed connected with wrong view is not the defilement of sensual desire. It is also proper to present them in the order of defilements. Thus, the statement about defilements is for the purpose of showing what is to be abandoned. Therefore, when they are presented as abandoned, it is proper to present them in the order of the enumeration of those defilements to be abandoned, and also of the paths that abandon them. 1121. In the section on the first analysis of conceit, it refers to the description of conceit as “I am superior.” For there it is said: “Someone, by birth, or by lineage, or by family, or by beauty of complexion, or by wealth, or by learning, or by profession, or by craft, or by knowledge, or by hearing, or by eloquence, or by some other thing, utters conceit. Such conceit is a notion… …a desire for prominence in the mind” (Vibhaṅga 866). Referring to this meaning, that superior conceit is analyzed without touching upon a specific individual, but occurring in relation to a superior, an equal, and an inferior, it says: “One conceit is said to arise in three types of people.” And this is not only stated in the first analysis of conceit, but also in the second and third analyses of conceit. This should be seen as an example. Or, it refers to the analysis of all three conceits, stated without reference to individuals, as “in the first analysis of conceit.” For the analysis of the nine conceits, such as “the conceit ‘I am superior’ of the superior,” which are stated with reference to individuals, is the second analysis of conceit. ...without touching the person of that mass of conceit, from the mentioned mass of conceit, as second and third. And also, in the second division of conceit as stated, "three kinds of conceit arise for each person" is said, and to show the same view as the explanation of meaning given here, "in the first division of conceit" is stated. That very conceit has come here, and the meaning stated there is appropriate, this is the intention. By way of making conceit, by way of doing actions such as "I am better." "Taking one after another" - this is said with reference to the meaning that previous conceits, by being a supporting condition for subsequent ones, produce them and become exceedingly strong. The mind desirous of a banner (fame/prominence) reaches an exceedingly elevated state, therefore it is specified by "mind." 1126. Expressing a state of intolerance is annoyance. Making dear with the mind, such a kind of honoring is called reverence, this is the meaning. By way of causing envy, by way of actions of intolerance regarding gain and so on. 1127. The word "noble disciples" is for showing the absence of stinginess in the Dhamma of penetration, meaning "only noble disciples have penetration, and they are not stingy with it." "Text" means the Pāli. "Path of discourse" means the commentary composition. "Another Dhamma" means breaking up wholesome Dhamma and so on, and making unwholesome Dhamma and so on, out of one's own greed, as spoken by the Tathāgata or by sectarians, he will confuse it. "Having revealed himself" means having declared himself to be otherwise than he is. "Whoever then" refers to a sectarian or a householder, unwilling to see the faulty nature of his own doctrine, out of ignorance or strong attachment. "Unwilling to spread" means hesitant; its state is hesitation. "Disrespectful" means devoid of respect in giving due to stinginess. Taking food with a ladle is a ladle-grasp; like a ladle-grasp is a ladle-grasp. Just as a ladle-grasp does not spread the food as stated, so too is stinginess regarding dwellings and so on. Or "grasp" means that by which it is grasped; the ladle itself is the grasp, a ladle-grasp. Just as it, with its tip contracted, does not spread, so too is stinginess. Withholding what is grasped, or what is not grasped; its nature is ungraspedness: this is stinginess. "May dwellings and so forth, whether common or uncommon to others, be only mine!" — thus, by way of occurrence, is the characteristic of grasping one's own possessions. "Let it not be another's!" — thus, by way of occurrence, is the characteristic of concealing one's own possessions. These two should be combined. But what is said as "desiring to take another's property," that is said to show the supporting condition of greed for another's property, which is stinginess. Thus, it should be understood. If indeed that were a demonstration of the occurrence of stinginess, then the characteristic of grasping another's property would have to be stated. The distinction between covetousness and sensual passion might be the state of being two defilements or one defilement. And the state of non-defilement for non-covetousness; thus, the existence of non-defiling greed should be investigated. Indeed, there is no seventh or ninth question (in the Paṭṭhāna) that states: "Defilement and non-defilement phenomena are conditions by way of root-cause for defilement phenomena