English
No, it does not. Because one word does not denote different kinds, qualities, and actions. Indeed, the word "māsa" is not a single word that denotes different kinds like time and so on, by means of a single remaining form. And here, if a single remaining form were made, the second and third words "Dhamma" should not be stated. But they are stated. Therefore, just like the words "wholesome" and so on, which, despite a common form in non-different wholesome kinds and so on, and like the words "māsa," which refer to three or two different kinds, the three or two words "Dhamma" are established. Thus, the triads and dyads become a hexad and tetrad respectively. And there is no connection between the terms. This means that there is no connection between the terms for wholesome states among themselves, and similarly for the terms for unwholesome states and indeterminate states. For a connection is desired between two and two, not among all six. or of four, one with another. But why is this objection raised? Surely, when there is a difference in meaning, it is appropriate to say that there is no connection among the words for phenomena, such as wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate, when they are spoken to show a different meaning, just like the words for good, bad, and neutral? This is true. But the previous objection was made by assuming the non-connection as established, saying, "the triads and dyads would become sixes and fours." Here, however, it should be understood that this objection is raised to prove that non-connection. Alternatively, the explanation here should be made thus: If you do not want the state of sixes and fours, there must be a connection between the terms in the manner stated. And that connection of two terms with the same case ending would be appropriate if they had the same meaning. But you say there is a difference in meaning, and so there is no connection between your terms, or rather, it does not arise. The word "ca" (and) is for emphasis. The meaning is that for one who does not want the state of sixes and fours, but wants a difference in meaning, "prior and posterior... (etc.) ... become useless." And to show that a connection must necessarily be desired, lest there be a contradiction between prior and posterior, he says, "And that which is..." and so on. For the question, by inverting the terms, "Are phenomena wholesome?" indicates the sameness of meaning of the words "wholesome" and "phenomena" mentioned here. And for you, who say there is a difference in meaning, a contradiction arises even with that question, because "phenomena are wholesome" is not the case. And since that question is asked in that way, a difference in meaning is not appropriate. Another method: He objects to the sameness of meaning of the three words for phenomena by means of the sameness and difference of meaning of the two terms "wholesome phenomena" and so on. In "the sameness of the three phenomena" and so on, just as there is a sameness in the sense of being Indra of the meanings of Indra expressed by the three words for Indra, and a sameness of the meanings of Sakka, Purindada, and Sahassakkha, which are not different from that; so too, there is a sameness in the sense of being phenomena of the meanings of the three words for phenomena, and a sameness of the meanings of wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate, which are not different from that. This is the meaning. "Dhamma" means "state" (bhāva), so by the meaning of "holding its own nature" and so on, it is called "dhamma." said, and that is of its own nature, not of non-nature, speaks with this intention. Let there be being, then what? If there is difference in meaning for the three terms for phenomena, whichever one phenomenon among the three is being, then the others, wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate, each one is being. But the phenomena that have become being, the other two become non-being. Then the others, among the wholesome, etc., whichever two are non-being. And even that one phenomenon taken as being, even that, among the three terms for phenomena of similar form, due to the absence of a rule that this alone is the meaning of being, if another has the meaning of being, it becomes non-being. Then even the others attain non-being, and for all the wholesome, etc., there is the consequence of non-being. Indeed, if Indra is not human, then for others like Sakka, there is no humanity. Is it not so? Even so, without one being being, the non-being of others cannot be said. And there, due to the absence of a rule that it must be by one being alone, if the being of all three is established, then for the others, even for the wholesome, etc., is being established? It is not. Because the state of having different meanings for the three terms for phenomena is not admitted. Indeed not, if all three are being, there is no difference in meaning. And that is admitted by you. Is it not so? Even if the three phenomena are non-being, there would be no difference in meaning? Let there not be difference in meaning. But to you who admit difference in meaning, I say, "This is the fault." But by me, neither difference in meaning nor sameness in meaning is admitted. So how could there be a contradiction for me? Or else, by the phenomena that have attained non-being, even the other wholesome, etc., would indeed be non-being. This statement, without a rule, refers to the consequence of non-being for whichever two phenomena have attained non-being, and for whichever two wholesome, etc., among the others, because of one being being. And what was said: "And by them, even another beyond wholesome would be non-being," that was said to show the absence of a rule, not to prove the non-being of all. Indeed, this is the meaning there: of that beyond unwholesome, or that beyond indeterminate. when the Dhamma exists, there is no other skillful person. All this is without reason. Here, reason means justification. Just as with the words "skillful" and "unskillful," which are absolutely identical in meaning, or as with the words "skillful," "form," and "eye," which are absolutely different in meaning, having made such distinctions, the repetition, the six or four offenses, the absence of connection or contradiction, the imputation of faults, all these justifications are said to be without reason. Thus, it is said that there is no identity or difference in meaning. Whatever consent there is, according to that consent, from the establishment of usage by consent, or according to consent, or as consent has occurred, so too is the establishment of usage in accordance with it. For consent, due to the absence of a qualifier and a qualified, in things absolutely non-different, is sometimes used to clarify the meaning of a word whose meaning is not fully revealed by the inclusion of a specific action or quality, as in "Sakka is Indra, the giver of cities." Sometimes in things absolutely different, as in "Let dhava, khadira, and palāsa be brought." Sometimes in things having both difference and non-difference, due to the presence of a qualifier and a qualified, as in "blue lotus" or "wise man." By each such consent, those usages are established in accordance with it. Therefore, here too, the usage of the words "skillful" and "Dhamma," due to the presence of a qualifier and a qualified, with the inclusion of specific and general meanings, in the same meaning, with both difference and non-difference, is consented to. And by each such consent, this usage is established in accordance with it. Therefore, it is said, "All this is without reason." They reveal their own specific meaning, meaning that they reveal the nature of the Dhamma word as blameless, pleasant, resulting in skillful states, etc., as grasped by oneself, as spoken by oneself, by way of revealing that meaning's nature. For the word "Dhamma" does not become a skillful state. By this means, it is said that "the word 'Dhamma' is seen in recitation, etc.," and "holding one's own nature," etc. For it is the same everywhere. The word "skillful" is not seen in health, etc., as in "they lie in the despised," etc. And that specific method is " that by this, “We will speak only of the special qualities from now on,” it should be understood as removed. For, the special qualities are not “associated with pleasant feeling, which arises by taking special qualities like wholesome,” and so on. 2. In “and the abandoning of pleasure,” the pleasure faculty is called “pleasure,” and since that is pleasant feeling, it is said, “it is seen in pleasant feeling,” and not because the word “pleasure” is synonymous with the word “pleasant feeling,” as in phrases like, “These three feelings, monks, are pleasant feelings,” and so on. For this word “pleasure,” in the sense of the pleasure faculty, arises by taking bodily pleasure, bodily support, a special kind of comfort, and not by taking comfort in general, as the word “pleasure” does in phrases like, “whatever feeling one feels, whether pleasant,” or “who sees pleasure as suffering,” and so on. That in the presence of which the causes of pleasure arise, that is the root of pleasure. And when there is the arising of the Buddha, and dispassion such as the transcending of sensual pleasures, the causes of pleasure, such as the tranquility of merit, arise; therefore, that is called “the root of pleasure, pleasure.” And because of being the object of pleasure, “form is pleasure” is said. “Merits” – this word is a designation for pleasure, a designation for desirable result, meaning that it is the opposite of undesirable result for that purpose. The place, the occasion, of pleasant things like forms, which are causes of pleasure, is heaven and the Nandana garden; therefore, “heaven is pleasure, Nandana is pleasure” is said. “In this visible world” means in this existence. “Pleasant abidings” refers to the abidings of the first jhāna and so on. They are called “unafflicted”