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but rather, to show that the grasping of that and any other part of the robe is meant, it is said, "and here, of whatever part," and so on. "Such and such a place" means a place of that name. "Filling in order or out of order" is merely an example. Therefore, it means filling in order or out of order, or with one interval, or by any other method. "Those offenses" means those offenses that have been incurred. Just as in each matter, so too, separately, in seven matters, even if transgressed a hundred times, one confesses those offenses and is freed. "Goes to the count" means goes to the count of what has been confessed. "Having laid down the burden" means having resolved, "I will incur another matter." The explanation of the eight-matter training rule is finished. Thus, in the Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī, the commentary on the Pātimokkha, in the Vinayatthamañjūsā, the Līnatthappakāsanī, the explanation of the Pārājika section in the Bhikkhunī Pātimokkha is finished. The Saṅghādisesa Section 1. Explanation of the Training Rule Concerning One Who Speaks from Arrogance "By way of human arrogance, by way of anger-arrogance" is said by way of abundance. Therefore, it will say, "threefold mind, threefold feeling." "For the purpose of making a dispute" – here, "dispute" refers to a legal decision. What monastics also call "an issue," it means for the purpose of making that, for the purpose of a legal decision. "At the very moment of transgression" means at the very moment of the matter's transgression, not at the third admonition—this is the intention. "Expels the bhikkhunī from the Saṅgha" means expels the bhikkhunī who has incurred the offense from the Saṅgha of bhikkhunīs. And this is a usage of the agent in the cause. because it was said, “A phenomenon that is a cause for going forth is called ‘that which is to be gone forth from’.” “Where she stands,” means in which place she stands, among dwellings, alms-rounds, roads, and so on. “Going from there onwards,” means going from there onwards to the lay people. “Second,” means at the second announcement. “By him,” means by the lay follower. “Having been told thus,” means having been told, “How about our story and yours? You yourself announce it.” “She makes another tell it,” means she makes a suitable attendant tell it. “Whether it is announced this way or that way,” means whether the suitable attendant announces the nun’s story first, or the other person announces his own story. Or whether the suitable attendant announces both their stories, or the other person announces both their stories— thus, whether it is announced this way or that way. “Having heard both stories,” means having heard both stories, which were announced this way or that way. “She goes being drawn,” means being called, she goes to the lay people. This is connected with “she is not guilty.” Thus in the remaining cases too. “She asks for protection,” means she asks for lawful protection. Now, to show how the protection asked for is lawful, it was said, “telling of misconduct done by others in the dwelling, without specifying.” There, concerning the past, there is telling by specifying, and there is telling without specifying. Concerning the future too, there is telling by specifying, and there is telling without specifying. How is there telling by specifying concerning the past? In the nun’s dwelling, village boys, rogues, or whoever else commit misconduct, or cut down trees, or steal fruits and vegetables, or seize requisites. The nun approaches the lay people and says, “Such and such was done in our dwelling.” When asked, “By whom?” she tells, “By so-and-so and so-and-so.” Thus, there is telling by specifying concerning the past; that is not permissible. If, having heard that, those lay people punish them, the nun is responsible for everything. “Punishment” Even with the intention "they will take the stick," it is a neck-offence. But if she says to him, "Take the stick," and five *māsakas* are taken, it is a *pārājika* offence. But when they ask, "By whom?" it should be said, "It is not proper for us to say 'by so-and-so.' You yourselves will know. Indeed, we only ask for protection. Give that to us. And have the stolen goods brought back." Thus, there is an indirect report. That is permissible. If, when this is said, those officials search for the perpetrators and punish them, even if all their property is confiscated, the bhikkhunī has neither a neck-offence nor any other offence. Seeing them carrying away requisites, it is not permissible to say "Thief! Thief!" wishing them ill. For if, when this is said, they are punished, all of it is a neck-offence for the bhikkhunī. But it is permissible to say to one's own attendant: "My requisites were taken by this one. Have them brought back. But do not punish him." If they make a half-share for slaves or servants, this is called an improper half-share. It is not permissible. How is a direct report made concerning the future? In the manner already stated, when others commit misdeeds and so forth, the bhikkhunī says to the officials: "They do such and such in our monastery. Give us protection so that they do not do it in the future." When asked, "By whom was this done?" she reports, "By so-and-so and so-and-so." Thus, there is a direct report concerning the future. That, too, is not permissible. For if they are punished, all of it is a neck-offence for the bhikkhunī, in the same way as before. The rest is just like before. But if the officials, for those committing such misdeeds in the bhikkhunī monastery, have a drum beaten, proclaiming, "We will inflict such and such a punishment!" and search for those who do not abide by the order, and then punish them, the bhikkhunī has neither a neck-offence nor any other offence. And what has been stated for bhikkhunīs, the same rule applies to bhikkhus. For a direct report by a bhikkhu is also not permissible. If, when such a report is made, they are punished, all of it... A neck is. In the manner stated, for one causing a punishment to be taken, it is a pārājika offense. But if one, even knowing "they will inflict punishment," speaks without specifying, and they search and inflict punishment, there is no fault. For those cutting trees and so on within the monastery boundary, to take their chisels, axes, and so on, and strike them against stones, is not permissible. If the blade breaks, it must be caused to be made and given back. To run up and seize their belongings, that too should not be done. For the mind is easily changeable; if a thought of theft arises, it could even lead to expulsion from the order. The explanation of the training rule concerning 'speaking of high things' is finished. 2. Explanation of the training rule concerning 'causing a thief to rise'. Among 'Mallagaṇa, Bhaṭiputtagaṇa, and so on,' 'Mallagaṇa' means a group devoted to Nārāyaṇa, performing various meritorious deeds such as placing water and digging ponds here and there. 'Bhaṭiputtagaṇa' means a group devoted to Kumāra. 'Dhammagaṇa' means a group devoted to the teaching, performing various kinds of meritorious deeds. 'Gandhikaseṇī' means a group making various kinds of fragrant products. 'Dussikaseṇī' means a group of cloth merchants, meaning a group of weavers. 'Vuṭṭhāpentiyā' means 'causing to be ordained'. When bhikkhunīs have departed for some business, if one, without going to a broken boundary, ordains with her own dependent assembly in the very place where they were sitting, it arises from speech and mind. If one goes to another boundary or a river and ordains, it arises from body, speech, and mind. Thus it is said, 'the origin of causing a thief to rise'. The action or non-action is in the manner of ordaining without asking permission. Or it is 'three-minded' in the sense that even noble ones, not knowing the rule, ordain, or in the sense of being endowed with karmically indeterminate results at the moment of offense at the conclusion of the kammavācā. The explanation of the training rule concerning 'causing a thief to rise' is finished. 3. Explanation of the training rule concerning 'going to another village'. Another village is 'gāmantara'. 'Nadipāra' means the far bank of the river. Because it is said 'should go to another village', the offense occurs only in another village, not in one's own village. he says, "from one's own village," and so on. When she has crossed the boundary or the vicinity, that is, when she has crossed the boundary of a walled village, or the place suitable for a boundary of an unwalled village. When she has just crossed with the second foot, that is, when she has just crossed with the second foot the boundary or the vicinity of the other village. But in those books where the reading is found: "When she has crossed the boundary of the other village with one foot, or entered its vicinity, a grave offense; when she has just crossed with the second, or just entered, a Sanghādisesa," there, the two words "entered" and "just entered" are contrary to the Pāli. For the Pāli says: "When she causes to cross the vicinity of an unwalled village" (Pāci. 692). Likewise, they are contrary to the Samantapāsādikā. For there it is said: "When she crosses with one foot the place suitable for a boundary, a grave offense. When she has just crossed with the second, a Sanghādisesa. Moreover, here, from one's own village... (and so on)... when she has just crossed the boundary or the vicinity of the other village with one foot, a grave offense; when she has just crossed with the second, a Sanghādisesa." It is said. From the statement "when she causes the first foot to cross," and so on (Pāci. 692), it is intended here that the going is by foot, so he says, "an offense for one entering by foot." By this, it shows that even if she enters by elephant-back or by psychic power, it is still valid. This is the summary here; the detailed explanation is given in the Samantapāsādikā (Pāci. Aṭṭha.