English
In this interpretation of the meaning, the connection should be understood as, “If sheep’s wool arises for a bhikkhu… even if there is no carrier, for one who is on a journey, it is to be relinquished, a pācittiya.” Or because From the place of origin of the sheep's wool, a maximum of three yojanas is intended. And for one who has not set out on the path, there is no maximum of three yojanas. Therefore, it is said, "They may arise for one who has set out on a journey." Thus, it is established that there is no offense for one who takes and carries what has not been cut off. For their acquisition is indeed their origin. By "They are to be received by a bhikkhu who desires them," it is shown that an offense arises only if one exceeds three yojanas with what one has received oneself. Thus, it is established that there is no offense for one who, not desiring, carries what belongs to others and has been received. Among the conditions, "belonging to oneself" is not present. This meaning is to be understood as illuminated by "may arise for a bhikkhu" and by "having received what is not cut off." And in the old commentaries, it is said, "If one goes causing another bhikkhu to carry, there is no offense for both." Therefore, if two bhikkhus, having reached beyond three yojanas, exchange each other's goods and carry them, it is established that there is no offense. "They are to be carried by hand beyond three yojanas" means they are to be carried by oneself only up to three yojanas. For what purpose is that? Because of this limit of the boundary. For it is said, "I allow, bhikkhus, to establish a boundary up to three yojanas." (Mahavagga 140) And this limit is for one who goes with the intention of staying, or with the intention of returning. For it is said, "The group of six bhikkhus establish very large boundaries... bhikkhus coming for the Uposatha arrive even when the Pātimokkha is being recited, they arrive even when it has just been recited, and they stay in between." (Mahavagga 140) "If there is no carrier" means if there is no carrier by command. It is written that if one goes sitting on a blanket, and even a single hair is attached to the robe, there is an offense for exceeding three yojanas, because it is disentangled from the blanket. It is appropriate that because the blanket was received, it is considered as received for one's own use. The commentary on the training rule concerning sheep's wool is finished. 8. Commentary on the training rule concerning gold and silver. "Even the shade produced by a tree does not go beyond the tree's boundary" is written. The description of the training rule concerning gold is finished. 9. The description of the training rule concerning silver transactions. "Exchanging gold and silver" is said with the highest definition. The description of the training rule concerning silver transactions is finished. 10. The description of the training rule concerning buying and selling. "When it is not present, a pācittiya must be confessed." Here, is it a pure pācittiya, or a nissaggiya? It is indeed a nissaggiya pācittiya. The description of the training rule concerning buying and selling is finished. Herein is this miscellany. The eighth training rule prohibits the acceptance, the causing to accept, and the approval of a rag-robe or silver given by another for one's own use, or given as an exchange. The ninth prohibits the exchange of silver for another or for oneself. The tenth concerns the exchange of non-silver. And the saying: "When one perceives non-silver as non-silver, there is no offense with the five," indicates that there is an offense with the others. And non-silver is an object of wrong-doing. Therefore, it is definitively stated that upon its exchange, it is nissaggiya. If the ancients say: "Since there is a possibility of no offense in exchanging the five objects of wrong-doing, there is indeed no offense"? No, because only permissible objects are mentioned there. If one says: "If a permissible object is nissaggiya, then how much more so a dukkaṭa object!"? No, because there is no rule that the gravity or lightness of the object corresponds to the gravity or lightness of the offense. Indeed, even precious and valuable things like pearls, gems, and lapis lazuli, are considered objects of wrong-doing (dukkaṭa). Therefore, pearls and the like are lighter than a nissaggiya object. Even with a light object, just as there is a dukkaṭa for accepting a dukkaṭa object, so too is it proper that there is a dukkaṭa for causing it to be bought by or for that (object). So say the Aṭṭhakathā teachers. Or else, regarding what was said: "because only permissible objects are mentioned there," even though objects of wrong-doing are also intended there, But it is not said in the Pāli for fear of the occasion of non-offence. Even when pearls etc. are mentioned, in a case of non-offence, one tells the steward: "These pearls etc. are ours, and we have need of this and this, like beryl." Saying this, one would incur an offence by the tenth (rule). This might be the intention. And since this is a transaction of telling the steward, it should be understood that it is stated in the ninth (rule). Although buying and selling is permitted with suitable items, by this same method, even an unsuitable item is intended to incur an offence in the tenth (rule). But due to contradiction with the commentaries, it should be taken as not intended. What is the shadow of the reason here? If it is said that because of the occasion of non-offence for five together there, it is indeed a non-offence? No, because it is not mentioned there. If it is said that it is stated for an unmentioned reason? No, because there is no special reason for five together, having an object of offence, to obtain a non-offence clause. Because of unsuitability, an offence must occur even for five together. Thus, the commentary's statement is established. Another method: If there is a Nissaggiya (offence) in buying and selling with an unsuitable item, the method stated for a suitable item would be found there. But it is not found. Therefore, those should be stated only in the ninth (rule). Therefore, the term "transaction" includes buying and selling, and also other forms of exchange. Without saying, "excluding buying and selling, if one causes to buy with 'give this for that', it is permissible," due to the contradiction with the allowance of Nissaggiya in their exchange by the method stated in the non-offence clause of the tenth (rule), by the method stated in the commentary, causing to buy with an unsuitable item is only a Dukkata (minor offence). If it is said that for them, it is Nissaggiya by buying and selling? No, because all of it is buying and selling. Therefore it is said: "In the Andhaka Commentary, however, it is stated: 'If one engages in buying and selling, it is Nissaggiya Pacittiya.' That is ill-spoken. Why? For there is no such thing as buying and selling other than giving and taking." (Parajika Atthakatha 2.589) According to one's own opinion, in what is considered the characteristic of buying and selling, the non-offence of the tenth (rule)... In the manner stated in the fourth (rule), in their exchange, and due to the contradiction with the permission for relinquishment. Or let this reason be forbidden by oneself, that in the tenth (rule) they must certainly be known, that they are indeed buying and selling, and that they have attained the state of relinquishment; thus also the commentary's statement is proven. Here the ancients said: "One makes one's own silver go into another's hand, transgresses, a wrong-doing. One makes another's silver go into one's own hand, by the eighth (rule) it is relinquishment. In the exchange of an object already taken, what happens? It becomes invalid. Then, one first makes another's silver go into one's own hand, because of the taking of silver, by the eighth (rule) it is relinquishment. One later makes one's own silver go into another's hand, by transaction it is relinquishment." For it is said there: "By the mere taking of silver, an offense by the eighth (rule); later, by exchange, by the ninth (rule)," and that is indeed appropriate. "Transgresses, a wrong-doing" is wrongly said. Because of the implication of an unspecified wrong-doing, it is shown in the relinquishment procedures. What is meant is this: if there are to be two relinquishments, in the relinquishment procedure it should be said: "Venerable Sir, I received silver, and I engaged in various kinds of silver transactions," because the taking of silver is mentioned everywhere in the Pāli as "causes silver to be bought." Thus, what was said in the ancient commentary: "When one avoids buying and selling with a wrong-doing object, and takes one of the four relinquishment objects, by the eighth (rule) it is relinquishment. When one takes a wrong-doing object with a wrong-doing object, saying 'give this for this,' by that very (act) it is relinquishment. When one takes even buying and selling, it is a wrong-doing; by the taking of silver for purchase, by the eighth (rule); by exchange, by the ninth (rule), etc., by not favoring oneself, but by taking it out in a permissible way, it is proper to exchange it with five fellow monks." That is clarified. And further it was said there: "relinquishment..." If there is no acquisition, how is there an offense of expiation? If a released lay follower, saying 'he does not discard even ill-disposed silver,' takes it and gives it to another bhikkhu, it is allowable. And that is ill-said. For by being taken, it does not become another object. Again, something else was said there: "For one who says 'take this,' there is an offense of wrong-doing due to the destruction of a gift of faith; for one who says 'give this,' there is an offense of wrong-doing due to a request." And that is ill-said. For there, an offense of wrong-doing in application seems appropriate.