English
or is it a word that is specifically applicable, not encompassing them? And what if it is a universally applicable word? Then this alone should be said everywhere, not the others. If it is a specifically applicable word, there is a contradiction in "one washes what is not said, one has washed what is not used." And if "one dyes or disentangles what is not said, it is to be relinquished," would lead to an undesirable consequence? The Buddha's words are merely a display of teaching style, sometimes a three-word statement, sometimes a one-word statement, they speak of a universally applicable word. If there is a contradiction here in "one has washed finished goods," and if "one has finished goods disentangled, there is no offense" would lead to an undesirable consequence, then it is no offense? No, the disentangling of unfinished goods, of clean wool, should be given from this. If it is said that disentangling of those gathered together by washing with water and so on is permissible? Then there should be no offense in disentangling an old rug, but that is not appropriate due to the statement "one has washed what is not used." Therefore, it is established that if one has used goods washed, dyed, or disentangled, it is to be relinquished. And those used goods are indeed finished goods. For it is not possible to use sheep's wool. Otherwise, the statement "one has washed what is used" would be meaningless. For it is not said here, "or one should have old sheep's wool washed." There is a statement as in the rule concerning old robes. There, it is by way of what has been taken, here, it is written. If it is a writing error? No, because there is no special reason, in the rule concerning old robes, an unused item made is called, "a blanket, a rug, a coverlet, etc." Even though this meaning is established by this word, "causes to be washed" might be without a specific reference. It might be with a specific reference. For it is without a specific reference in "one who washes without being told," etc. It is with a specific reference in "causes an item made to be washed." If it is said that "causes an unmade item to be washed or dyed, there is no offense," and "causes to be unraveled, there is no offense," by the measure of these statements, there is indeed no offense? No, by the measure of the statements themselves, an offense is incurred. If the statement "causes an unused item to be washed" itself indicates that there is no offense for one who unravels an unused coverlet? It is established that there is indeed an offense for one who unravels a used item. The commentary on the rule concerning causing sheep's wool to be washed is finished. 8. Commentary on the Rule Concerning Money 583-4. "All" means of three kinds. "Pearls, gems, lapis lazuli, conch shells," etc., although mentioned in the rule concerning kings by way of "it is not allowable," by way of their nature, they are said to have begun to be spoken of in their own place by way of showing an offense. How is this? The own place of pearls, etc., has arisen, for they are not seen in the Pāli text here, and they are mentioned in the commentary on the rule concerning kings. Not only gold and silver, but also other things like fields and land are generally said to be "not allowable to accept what is not suitable," not by their nature. In the Pāli text, however, only "money or gold or pearls or gems for the price of robes" is mentioned by nature, therefore the rule concerning kings is their own place. By the inclusion of pearls and gems here, the inclusion of their kind is already established, as this was legislated first. If so, since they are not mentioned here, which is their own place? This is by meaning, not by nature. Therefore. How so? For these nissaggiya objects and dukkaṭa objects in the Jewel Precept are collectively referred to as "jewel," and a suitable object is referred to as "deemed a jewel." Among these ten jewels, silver and gold are nissaggiya objects here; the rest are dukkaṭa objects, thus it is established. And because it is established here, in the non-offense section of the Jewel Precept, it is said, "He takes what is deemed a jewel with trust, he takes it temporarily, for one who perceives it as a rag," not "jewel." But the seven kinds of grain, female and male slaves, fields, etc., are established as unsuitable according to the Brahmajalasutta and other suttas, therefore it is established here as a dukkaṭa object. For this very reason, in the section on inquiry, it is said, "He knows the Dhamma, what is in accordance with the Dhamma, the Vinaya, what is in accordance with the Vinaya." Similarly, does raw meat also incur a dukkaṭa object? No, because it is permitted in the Vinaya, as in "I allow, bhikkhus, raw meat for ailments caused by non-humans," etc. Therefore, raw meat, even if mentioned in the suttas, is not a dukkaṭa object. Nevertheless, for one's own consumption, accepting it is indeed a dukkaṭa, so the teacher does not think so. They say, "When told 'Deposit it here,' it is merely accepting a deposit." "If the consideration of what is unsuitable is not allowed? It stands relying on both suitable and unsuitable, meaning that it itself is unsuitable for consumption, but a suitable item of equivalent value is available for consumption," it is written, "Because it stands as a rag, and because pointing out a protected place is suitable, it stands relying on the suitable. Because one who says 'Take this' is unsuitable, it stands relying on the unsuitable." Even so, "suitable and unsuitable" means "placed in this spot, why do you not see these very coins?" Such a statement is suitable, so it stands relying on the suitable. When told "Take this," because of the wrong consideration, it is unsuitable for oneself, so what comes from that is un It stands by what is not allowable. When it is said, "Take this," and it is taken by him, it does not fall under the rule of "or cause it to be taken up," but merely due to ill-management, it becomes unallowable for him. Because the original acceptance is pure, it is like the third leaf in the subsequent four leaves. Thus, Elder Upatissa says this, as stated in the Anugaṇṭhipada. What more to say? Due to its pure origin, it is allowable. If there is ill-management, it stands by what is unallowable, this is not the teacher's reasoning. It is said, "Even when dedicated for the benefit of the Sangha, groups, etc., it has the same course, except for specific offenses." If nothing allowable has been caused to be bought, it shows the absence of means. It is said, "Having placed it as a deposit," if that lay follower says, "This money is too much, Venerable Sir, this should not be spent today," and places it himself in a deposit place, or causes another to place it, having placed this as a deposit, the Sangha, enjoying the proceeds obtained from it, is said to be enjoying requisites. 585. This one, indeed, is endowed with such characteristics, at its best. Even if thus endowed with qualities, if later, due to greed or some other reason, he makes a sign and causes it to fall, there is an offense of wrong-doing. Even a dwelling, in each use, he uses it. In each entry, he enters it. Indeed, for some reason, it is allowable even for one dwelling at the root of a tree, and for one dwelling in the open. When there is an intention to reside, in terms of standing, sitting, etc., it should be reflected upon in each use, in each use. Some say that mindfulness is a requisite for medicine at all times. For what is not stored, only after the meal. For what is stored, even before the meal, this is not the teacher's reasoning. Indeed, it is said (Pāci. 244): "He accepts what is for a watch, what is for seven days, what is for life, for the purpose of food... (etc.)... there is an offense of wrong-doing. In each swallowing, in each swallowing, there is an offense of wrong-doing." Indeed, the wrong-doing that comes in the training rule on eating at the wrong time is incurred at the wrong time, not at the right time, because it is mealtime. But that which comes in the training rule on storing, even at the right time, if stored... Because of being born of power, for that very reason, only these two, for seven days and for life, are mentioned there. If it is said, "This distinction is not obtained by the rule 'if there is a condition'," (we say) No, because of undesirable consequences, and because of the irregularity of the statement. Indeed, in the rule on storing, "No offense if one eats what is for a certain time, having stored it for that time. No offense if one eats what is for a watch, having stored it for that watch." (Pāci. 256) Here, by the authority of this statement, for one who eats what is for a watch, having stored it only for a watch, not before the meal, not after the meal, not in the day, not in the night, there would be no offense. This is an undesirable consequence. Likewise, right there, only this much is said: "One eats what is for a watch, having stored it for a watch. One eats what is for seven days, having stored it for seven days." It is not said, "if there is a condition." Therefore, the statement "if there is a condition" is sometimes present, and sometimes not. Because of this irregularity of statement, there would also be an irregularity of offense. Even if this is so, the dukkaṭa as stated is indeed incurred. If it is said, "No, because things like what is for a watch, etc., are not for the purpose of food," (we say) No, because food mixed with ghee, etc., attains the state of delicious food. Moreover, among all things for a certain time, that which is for a certain time (food) is substantial. For one who receives it for food, at the proper time, there is no offense. How much more so for things like what is for a watch, etc., which are not substantial, as they are permitted only for the purpose of food. If it is said, "No offense only in the case of what is for a certain time,"