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that is immeasurable here, it is not a cause for the infatuation of both, as in the case of physical contact with bhikkhunīs. "Physical contact" means the joining of the bodies of both. However, in the word division, it is said: "to enter into' is called 'transgression'," that refers to the entering into, not the physical contact. For the entering into physical contact is called "transgression." But in the Commentary, it is said: "that which is called physical contact, that in essence is transgression," that contradicts the characteristic stated later in the Pāḷi: "if the intention is to serve, but one does not exert with the body, one perceives the touch, there is no offense" (Pārā. 279). For contact is indicated by the perception of touch. If that is transgression, how is there no offense? This is well said, but by extracting the phrase "should enter into physical contact" and by the common division of both words "is called transgression," in the absence of that which is to be entered into, due to the absence of entering into, it might be said: "that in essence is transgression." In "or taking by the hand," the entire appropriable body is included by the hand, not a separate continuum like hand ornaments connected to it. By taking by the braid, it should be understood that the non-appropriable, non-separate continuum such as hair, body-hair, nails, teeth, etc., arising from kamma, season, etc., is taken. Therefore, the Commentary says: "even by touching an appropriable or non-appropriable thing with some non-appropriable thing like hair, etc., one incurs a Saṅghādisesa" (Pārā. Aṭṭha. 2.274). Therefore, the limb-status of even non-appropriable things like hair, body-hair, etc., should be understood. Even so, if it is asked: "This contradicts the Pāḷi Commentary's method: 'if one perceives the touch, a Saṅghādisesa with three factors. If one does not perceive the touch, a Dukkaṭa with two factors'?" No, because of understanding its meaning. For even if one perceives the state of being touched, one perceives the touch. 'knows' means, this is one meaning, therefore, a monk, touching the mutual contact of a woman and the hairs etc. belonging to his own body, and delighting in that, is said to know contact, not merely by the arising of body-consciousness. Body-consciousness here is not constant. If a monk, when touched by a woman's appropriated body or unappropriated body, has a body-faculty that is pleased by his own appropriated body, body-consciousness arises in him, and by that he is said to know contact. If his body is unappropriated, or he is greedy and his body-faculty is displeased, or his body is afflicted by a cold wind, body-consciousness does not arise in him. And by that he is not said to know contact, but merely by striving with the intention of intercourse, he attains bodily contact and is said to know contact by mind-consciousness. Therefore it is said: "By 'he might attain bodily contact,' the knowing of contact by his striving is shown." Another monk, touched by something attached to a woman's body or something discarded by her, is said to know contact by causing body-consciousness to arise. Therefore it is said: "Body-consciousness here is not constant." Another monk, covering a sleeping woman with a cloth, and gently touching the upper part of the cloth with the lust for bodily contact, even if he does not perceive the contact of hairs protruding through the cloth, striving with his body with the intention of intercourse, is said to know contact, and incurs a Saṅghādisesa offense. For it is said: "He touches the body, intending to touch blue, it is a Saṅghādisesa." This is the second meaning. Thus, because of these many meanings, and because of this difficult-to-understand intention, the knowing of contact was not stated as a factor in the Mātika commentary. For if it were stated, there would be a possibility that a monk, even after incurring a Saṅghādisesa, might say: "I saw contact with a nail or hair, but body-consciousness did not arise in me from the touching of hair, and my body was stiff from cold wind, so I do not know contact," and thus consider himself not to have offended. This is not the case. It is said, and also, "He understands contact, and he does not understand contact"—having shown the method stated in the commentary for these terms, he should be made to understand. By this much, the reason "he does not know its meaning" is elaborated. Explanation of the Word Analysis 271. Although it is generally said, "The mind that is 'attached' here means 'changed' in meaning," it should be understood as 'attached' by the defilement of bodily contact, because in the disciplinary cases it is said, "He touches a mother with a mother's affection...pe... an offense of wrong-doing." Similarly, although "woman means a human female" is said without distinction, nevertheless, a human female whose faculties are not destroyed is intended here, because it is said, "He engaged in bodily contact with a dead female...pe... an offense of grave offense." Even though "human female" would suffice, the statement "not a female yakkha, not a female peta, not an animal" means that not every female with a human form, even if her faculties are not destroyed, is called a human female here. For female yakkhās and others, by their inherent special power, when they accomplish things, they can take on human forms, so this is stated to show that. Among these, a female yakkha is a grave offense case, because in the disciplinary cases, a grave offense is stated for bodily contact with a female yakkha. In accordance with this, a female peta and a female deva are also grave offense cases. An animal female is a wrong-doing case. Some say that a female animal in human form is also a grave offense case. However, in the Vibhaṅga, due to the absence of the Pāli text "and she is a human female and perceives her as a human female," if there were statements like "and she is a female and perceives her as a female yakkha," there would be the implication that female yakkhās and others are not females. And if female yakkhās and others were included in "and she is a female and perceives her as a female," there would be the implication that they are cases of offenses entailing suspension. Therefore, it should be understood that female yakkhās and others are not mentioned. Some say, "In the disciplinary case, 'a certain monk with an animal female's body...pe... an offense of wrong-doing,' a natural animal female with a non-human form is intended, therefore a wrong-doing is stated. ' And a woman is perceived as an animal, and an animal is perceived as a woman, in such cases too, a common animal is intended, and that is an animal male. Therefore, in the training rules concerning coarse speech, and self-service of lust, just as the cases related to human males, the cases related to animals are not included, they say. Similarly, "paṇḍaka" here means a human paṇḍaka, and "purisa" here means a human male. Therefore, non-human females, non-human paṇḍakas, non-human males, animal females, animal paṇḍakas, and human, non-human, and animal hermaphrodites— these eight types of people are not included here. Based on them, the decision regarding the distinction or non-distinction of offenses due to differences in object perception and doubt, and the counting of unmentioned cases should be known by one who is not confused, as well as their cases of pairs and mixtures, and the decision regarding the distinction of offenses and non-offenses. Among these, non-human paṇḍakas, non-human males, animal females, and animal paṇḍakas— these four are grounds for a dukkaṭa offense. Non-human females and human hermaphrodites are grounds for a thullaccaya offense. Non-human hermaphrodites and animal hermaphrodites are grounds for a dukkaṭa offense. However, in the Pāli text, non-human females, non-human paṇḍakas, hermaphrodites, and males are not mentioned because they are not included. Animal females, paṇḍakas, and hermaphrodites are not mentioned because they are of the same category as animal males. Human hermaphrodites are not mentioned because they are of the same category as human paṇḍakas, they say. However, in the Commentary (Pārā. Aṭṭha. 2.281), since it is stated that "even with a Nāga maiden, even with a Supaṇṇa maiden, even with a Kinnarī, even with a cow, it is only a dukkaṭa," that should be taken as the authority. Herein is this consideration: "Monks, the Pātimokkha should not be recited in an assembly where an animal is present" (Mahāva. 183). Here, since it is stated in the Commentary (Kaṅkhā. Aṭṭha. Nidāṇavaṇṇanā) that "an animal is one whose full ordination is prohibited," an animal... A human-bodied animal is superior to an ordinary animal. Similarly, regarding human-bodied yakshas, petas, and animals, it is stated, "When suffering arises from an animal, it is merely a dukkaṭa," which indicates a distinction. And from the specific statement about offenses, "The form of falling is the measure, not the form of dying," and from the general rule, "If, with both sides exposed, a yaksha, or a peta, or a paṇḍaka, or a human-bodied animal, touches the body with the body below the armpit and above the knee-cap, there is an offense of thullaccaya" (Pāci. 661), it is established that it is superior. Because of its superiority, there is a distinction for one who engages in bodily contact with a human-bodied animal-woman. Therefore, a specific offense should apply there. If a human-bodied animal-woman is also intended in the rule on bodily contact, then, since the absence of passion due to the sameness of form is not possible, she should also be mentioned in the rules on lewd speech and self-serving service, but she is not included. If it is said that she is not included because the cases are abbreviated in their original form? Since "a woman and an animal" are both present here, with the perception of "woman" for both,