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B030104Dvemātikāpāḷi(two outlines)

English

for others, but not for one person. By this alone, it is indeed an accusation, but the offense does not reach the head. However, when asked, "Why do you not perform acts of veneration, etc., for me?" it reaches the head only when combined with words like "You are not a recluse," and so on. Therefore, if a bhikkhu, standing near another bhikkhu, accuses him himself, saying "You have engaged in sexual intercourse," or "You are not a recluse," or indicating this meaning with a hand gesture, or causes him to be accused by a layperson or another renunciant, this is called "disparaging." "May I perhaps make him fall from this holy life." "May I perhaps remove that person from this supreme life." It is said that one disparages with this intention: "It would be good indeed if I were to make this person fall from this holy life." By this, taking one intention, the intention to make fall, the remaining seven intentions are rejected: the intention to insult, the intention to act, the intention to expel, the intention to suspend Uposatha, the intention to suspend Pavāraṇā, the intention to investigate, and the intention to preach Dhamma. After that, with... by me, at which time he is accused, at another time from that. Or being questioned, by the investigator, by such a method as "What have you seen?", being investigated, being examined. Or not being questioned, by any matter such as what was seen, or by any person such as an investigator, not being spoken to. But of these words, later on, "and the monk acknowledges the fault", is the connection with this. For this is said: whether being questioned thus, or not being questioned thus, and the monk acknowledges the fault, stands by it, admits it, it is a Saṅghādisesa. And this, for showing the time of manifestation of the groundlessness, is said. But the offense, at the very moment of accusation, he incurs. But here, regarding "that case is indeed groundless": it is groundless due to the absence of roots such as what was seen; it is a case due to its being a matter for settlement. For that which is referred to, begun, based on, or intended, for which settlements proceed, that is a case. But here, that which is called a Pārājika, is indeed an offense-case, is intended. For if that case is indeed groundless by roots such as what was seen, and this monk who came to accuse acknowledges the fault, stands by it, saying "I spoke falsely" and so on, he admits it, for that monk, at the very moment of accusation, it is a Saṅghādisesa. This is the meaning of the training rule in sequence of words. Concerning the Mettiyabhūmajaka monks in Rājagaha, it was laid down regarding the matter of accusing with a groundless Pārājika. It is a general enactment. It is with an intention. It is for one who has received the full ordination. A pure or impure person whom he accuses with a Pārājika, knowing "this one has not incurred (the offense)", with the intention of causing expulsion, for one who accuses without making an opportunity thus: "Venerable sir, grant me an opportunity, I wish to speak to you," if that one immediately knows "he is accusing me," for each word, it is a Saṅghādisesa and a Dukkata. For one who accuses after making an opportunity, it is a Saṅghādisesa. Even for one who accuses face to face with a hand gesture, the same rule applies. But for one who accuses behind one's back, it does not take effect. Having stood near oneself, he orders another bhikkhu. He accuses him by his word. For the one who caused the accusation, offenses arise in the manner stated. Then he too accuses saying, "I have seen, I have heard." For both persons, offenses arise just so. But with the intention of reviling, for one who speaks without having made an opportunity, both a pācittiya and a dukkaṭa arise in the manner stated. For one who speaks having made an opportunity, only a pācittiya arises. With the intention of a formal act, for one who performs any of the seven kinds of kamma not face to face, only a dukkaṭa arises. With the intention of rehabilitation, for one who says, "You have fallen into such-and-such an offense, rectify it," and for one who suspends the Uposatha or Pavāraṇā, there is no 'making opportunity'. But the field of suspension should be known. Even for an investigator, regarding a matter that has been brought up, for one who says, "This is yours here," with the intention of investigating, there is no 'making opportunity'. Even for a Dhamma speaker, in the manner of saying, "Whoever does this and this, he is not a recluse," and so on, for one who teaches Dhamma without specifying, there is no 'making opportunity'. But if, having specified and designated, he says, "So-and-so and so-and-so are not recluses, not lay followers," having descended from the seat, one should confess the offense and go. And for the insane and so on, there is no offense. Transgression of morality. Whom he accuses or causes to be accused, that he is considered "fully ordained." The perception of purity in him. By which pārājika he accuses, that it is baseless due to not having seen, etc. The accusation face to face with the intention of expulsion. And his knowing it at that moment. These are the five factors here. The origins and so on are similar to taking what is not given. And the feeling here is only painful. The explanation of the training rule concerning malicious accusation is finished. 9. Explanation of the training rule concerning "another's share." In the ninth (rule), regarding "another's share," and so on: "This is another's share," or "it has another's share," thus "another's share." "Adhikaraṇa" should be understood as a basis. It is said that "vatthu" is a foundation. For indeed, that which is... In the origin story, the goat was called "Dabba Mallaputta". That share, that portion, that side of Venerable Dabba Mallaputta, which is human birth and the state of a bhikkhu, from that, there is another share, another portion, another side, which is animal birth and the state of a goat. Or that other share exists for him. Therefore, it obtains the designation of "other-part". And because for those who say, "We make this Dabba Mallaputta by name," the basis, the object, the support for that naming designation, therefore, it is to be understood as "case" (adhikaraṇa). Indeed, referring to that, it was said, "Is it true, monks, that you make Dabba Mallaputta an 'other-part case'?" (Pārā. 391) It is not one of the dispute cases, etc. Why? Because it is impossible. For Mettiya and Bhūmajaka did not produce any trace or hint of an "other-part case" from any of the four cases. And there is no such thing as a "trace" of the four cases. Indeed, traces like birth-trace are said to be of persons only, not of dispute cases, etc. And that name "Dabba Mallaputta" is a certain "point" (desa) for that goat, which is in the state of an "other-part case," a mere "trace" (lesa) to disparage the elder with a pārājika offence. And here, "point" (desa) is that which is seen, that which is indicated, that which is spoken of as "this belongs to him." This is a designation for one of the categories like birth, etc. And "trace" (lesa) is when another thing is slightly attached, adheres, by mere usage. This is a designation for one of the categories like birth, etc. However, in the Word-analysis (Pārā. 393), that "other-part case" of which one might take a certain "point" or a mere "trace" to disparage with a pārājika offence, since that was revealed only by way of the origin story, therefore, without analyzing that, the four cases that arise by way of the general meaning of the word "case" and by way of extracting the meaning, their "other-part-ness" and their "that-part-ness" since they are not... to be known by those skilled in the Vinaya. Therefore, at the end, to reveal that it is an offense and a charge related to knowing the offense, it is said: "Of a case related to knowing something else, it is either related to knowing the offense or related to knowing the case," and so on. The rest of the interpretative discussion is similar to what was stated in the eighth [chapter]. But this is the distinction: This was laid down in the context of slandering with a Pārājika offense, taking a slight hint, a mere trace, of a case related to knowing something else. And here, even for one who perceives it as a charge related to knowing the offense, there is no offense. And among the factors, the act of taking a slight hint, a mere trace, of a case related to knowing something else is more significant. The explanation of the Aññabhāgiya training rule is finished. 10. Explanation of the Saṅghabheda Training Rule In the tenth [chapter], "of a united Saṅgha" means of a Saṅgha of bhikkhus who are in harmony, meaning united in mind and body. Therefore, in its word analysis (Pārā. 412), it is said: "A united Saṅgha is one with the same communion, standing within the same boundary." For one with the same communion is united in mind through sameness of thought, and one standing within the same boundary is united in body by giving bodily unity. "Should strive for a schism" means should endeavor for a schism, thinking, "How might this [Saṅgha] be split?" "Or a case conducive to schism" means a cause conducive to schism, to a Saṅgha-schism. For in this context, as in "for the sake of desire, on account of desire, a case of desire" (M.N. 1.168, 178), "case" is intended to mean "cause." That, in terms of schism-causing matters, is eighteenfold. "Taking up" means grasping. "Should uphold" means taking up that cause which is conducive to Saṅgha-schism, capable of bringing about Saṅgha-schism, he should both proclaim it and not abandon it. "He should be told by the bhikkhus thus" means by those who see him upholding it face-to-face, or by those who hear, "in such and such a monastery," by them, going even as far as the ultimate limit of half a yojana, whoever this is The sequence of words "Venerable one, do not...