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B030102Sāratthadīpanī ṭīkā 2(manifest core meaning re annotation 2)

English

enjoying by taking it off the body and putting it on again. "It should be reviewed before meals... and so on... in the last watch of the night" is the connection. Similarly, if one is unable, it should be reviewed four times, three times, twice, or just once a day, according to the aforementioned specific times. If dawn breaks while he has not reviewed it, "he stands in the position of enjoyment as a debt." Here, they say, "If he does not review his past enjoyment, saying, 'The robe that I enjoyed yesterday, that was only for warding off cold... and so on... for covering shame and nakedness. The almsfood that I enjoyed yesterday, that was not for sport,' he stands in the position of enjoyment as a debt." This should be investigated. "He enjoys the dwelling by enjoying" means by entering and re-entering. However, if one is unable to do so, it should be reviewed before meals and so on. That can be understood by the method stated below, so it is not stated separately here. "By the condition of mindfulness" means the condition of mindfulness. The condition of mindfulness of review for receiving and enjoying is appropriate. One should receive only after reviewing. is to be eaten. That is the meaning. Therefore it is said, “having made mindfulness,” and so on. Even so, even though reflection is proper in both instances, even so. Others, however, say, “‘by the condition of mindfulness’ means by the condition of the use of the medicine of mindfulness.” Even so, “even if there is a condition.” That is merely their opinion. For the virtue dependent on requisites is purified by reflection, not merely by the existence of requisites. Now, is not the virtue of restraint by the Pātimokkha spoken of by this, “for one who uses, there is no offense”? Therefore, what is the difference between the virtue dependent on requisites and the virtue of restraint by the Pātimokkha? It is said: In the first three requisites, the difference is evident. But in the case of the requisite for the sick, just as when a fence is made around a tree at its root and it is protected, its fruits are also protected, even so, when the virtue dependent on requisites is protected by reflection, the virtue of restraint by the Pātimokkha connected with it is also accomplished. For one who uses the requisite for the sick without reflecting, the virtue that is broken is the virtue of restraint by the Pātimokkha itself. But the virtue dependent on requisites is broken only for one who does not reflect in the after-meal period, the first watch of the night, and so on, until dawn. For even if one uses the requisite for the sick before the meal without reflecting, there is no offense. This is their distinction. Thus, having shown the purification of the virtue dependent on requisites, by that very connection, in order to show all purifications, he says, “For there are four kinds of purification,” and so on. Therein, that by which one is purified is purification. The teaching according to the Dhamma is purification, purification by teaching. Here, the arising from an offense should also be understood as included in teaching. But for offenses that are uprooted, the declaration of not being a bhikkhu is the teaching. Restraint distinguished by resolve is purification, purification by restraint. The seeking of requisites in a righteous and proper way is purification, purification by seeking. Reflection on the four requisites in the manner stated is purification, purification by reflection. This is the purification. in the sense of being well-seated. Among those pure in virtue, the teaching is pure, thus it is purity of teaching. The same method applies to the rest. "I will not do this again" - here, "this" refers to the breaking of the vow. "Having abandoned" means having avoided, having not done. That which is to be given is a gift (dāya). Those who take it are heirs (dāyādā). Since there is no enjoyment at all of things not permitted, and since there is enjoyment of things permitted, the requisites to be enjoyed by bhikkhus belong to the Blessed One. And the Discourse on Heirs of the Dhamma is the proof here: "Be heirs of the Dhamma, bhikkhus, not heirs of material things. I have compassion for you, 'How might my disciples be heirs of the Dhamma, not heirs of material things?'" Thus, the Discourse on Heirs of the Dhamma, which occurred in this way, is proof in this matter. For those who are not free from passion, due to being overcome by craving, there is no ownership in the enjoyment of requisites. In the absence of that, for those free from passion, there is ownership in them, due to the existence of enjoyment as they wish. Indeed, they enjoy requisites by seeing the repulsive as non-repulsive, and the non-repulsive as repulsive, or by avoiding both and remaining equanimous, and they fulfill the donors' wishes. Therefore, it is said: "For they, having transcended the slavery of craving, become owners and enjoy." But this enjoyment by a virtuous person, after reflection, is called debt-free enjoyment, because it is the opposite of debt-enjoyment. Just as a debtor cannot go to a desired place at will, so one engaged in debt-enjoyment cannot escape from the world. Therefore, because it is the opposite of that, the reflected enjoyment of a virtuous person is called debt-free enjoyment. Thus, without qualification, this is to be understood as a distinct enjoyment, separate from the four kinds of enjoyment. It is not mentioned separately here, or it is included in the enjoyment of inheritance. For a virtuous person, too, because they are endowed with this training, is called a trainee (sekha). "Of all" means of both noble ones and ordinary people. How are these for ordinary people? Do enjoyments arise? By way of figure of speech. Indeed, for a common person who stands in the practice of austerity, having abandoned craving for requisites, enjoyment with an unattached mind there, is like the enjoyment of an owner. But for one of good conduct, enjoyment after reflection is like an inheritance enjoyment, because the donors' wishes are not thwarted. Therefore it is said: "It falls under the enjoyment of an inheritance." Regarding the enjoyment of a virtuous common person, there is nothing to be said, because it is included among the trainees. The Sekkha Sutta is proof of this meaning. "Enjoyment with a conscientious one" means enjoyment taking what belongs to the conscientious one. "With an unconscientious one" here too, the method is the same. Indeed, from the very beginning, there is no such thing as an unconscientious one, by this it shows that suspicion should not be made towards those seen and known. His own dependents, such as co-residents. "He too should be prevented" - whoever sees this, by him he should be prevented. Since "enjoyment by an unconscientious one" is said of a conscientious one, therefore there is no offense, because both are unconscientious. It is said that "enjoyment by an unconscientious one" is merely a name and not obtained. "But they say there is an offense" - this is said in all three knot-passages. "Unrighteous" means arisen from improper seeking and so on. "Righteous" means arisen from alms-round and so on. "He gives it only to the Sangha" - not taking the food, he gives only the ticket he received. "But if a conscientious one supports an unconscientious one... etc. ... makes him disappear" - here, it is not proper to do so merely out of a desire to support. But it is proper for the sake of the Dhamma, the Dispensation, and for the benefit of listeners, this should be understood. Because it was said in the previous method, "he should be made to commit an offense," they say that this one indeed has an offense. Enjoyment of the Dhamma by way of recitation, learning, and so on, is Dhamma-enjoyment. Even though there is no offense for one who receives by way of Dhamma-support, the Elder, referring only to his unconscientious state, said, "Indeed, he is evil," and so on. "In his presence" - means in the presence of the Elder Mahārakkhita. 586. Starting with 'royal obstruction' and so on, it is said, because it arises merely from the intention 'I will take this.' Here, 'given by the owner' means it is not relinquished. Therefore, a kahāpaṇa tied to a thread, etc., given by the owner and received by a bhikkhu with the perception of an object, then neither is money given, nor is it received. In this case, there is no need to declare an offense. But it should be returned to the donors themselves. With that improper object, if those donors buy ghee and so on, and give it to the Saṅgha and to that bhikkhu, it is allowable for all, because it belongs to the donors themselves. However, in the Commentary, referring to what was given by those desiring merit, having relinquished it, it is said, 'those desiring merit... (etc.)... one who perceives non-money in money, receives money, this should be understood.' Therefore, even if one receives what was relinquished and given, with the perception of an object, it is still an offense entailing relinquishment. Therefore, if those donors do not come and take it, having asked the donors, if it is relinquished for one's own use, having relinquished it to the Saṅgha, the offense should be declared. By 'Look at your rag!' it indicates that even for lay property, an arrangement by an improper expression like 'Take this!' is not allowable for a bhikkhu. 'Having one distinction' means they are of one distinction due to the state of being an action or non-action. The state of being gold or silver, the state of being intended for oneself, the state of being one of kahāpaṇas and so on— these are the three factors here. The explanation of the training rule concerning money is finished. 9. Explanation of the training rule concerning money transactions 587. In the training rule concerning money transactions, the four kinds of objects entailing relinquishment, starting with gold, are here taken