English
it is "neither perception nor non-perception." Thus neither-perceptual-nor-non-perceptual existence. It is a part of formless existence. Existence pervaded by one form aggregate. Or one "vokāra" belongs to this existence, thus one-constituent existence. It is non-perceptual existence. Existence pervaded by four formless aggregates. Or four "vokāras" belong to this existence, thus four-constituent existence. It is formless existence. Existence pervaded by five aggregates. Or five "vokāras" belong to this existence, thus five-constituent existence. It is sense-sphere existence and a part of form existence. Or "vokāra" is a designation for aggregates. Therefore, the meaning here should be understood in this way, starting with: "one vokāra belongs to this existence, thus one-constituent existence." "The four jhānas" means the four rūpāvacara jhānas, which have not grasped a specific object. Or this is the taking of resultant jhānas. And here, the craving that is the strong support for wholesome states, the craving that gives rise to them, is to be understood as the prior craving. But for functional states, the craving that is the cause of the existence in which those functional states arise. Here, "in due order" means it should be connected in this sequence: "Formations are the truth of suffering, ignorance is the truth of origin." "Anubuddha" means one who is enlightened in accordance with the nature of what is to be understood. "Therefore" means because he is enlightened to all phenomena, both generally and specifically, by extracting each word, therefore it is said. What is said? He says: "Because of being rightly and fully enlightened to all phenomena," to all... It means that he himself fully understood all knowable things in every aspect without error. By this is shown the attainment of his omniscience, which is called unobstructed knowledge, which is independent of others' teaching, capable of understanding all things in every aspect, and whose activity is bound by aspiration. Is not unobstructed knowledge different from omniscience? Otherwise, the statement "the six extraordinary knowledges are the knowledges of a Buddha" would be contradicted. It is not contradicted, because the same knowledge is spoken of in two ways to show its extraordinary nature in relation to others, due to the difference in the way its object operates. For that knowledge is indeed one: it is omniscience because its object is all conditioned, unconditioned, and conventional things without remainder; and it is called unobstructed knowledge because there is no obstruction in it, and it moves without attachment. As it is said in the Paṭisambhidāmagga: "It knows all conditioned and unconditioned things without remainder, thus it is omniscience; there is no obstruction in it, thus it is unobstructed knowledge," and so on. Therefore, there is no difference between them in meaning, and this must be understood in this way absolutely. Otherwise, omniscience and unobstructed knowledge would be common, and not have all things as their object. For there is not even a particle of obstruction in the knowledge of the Blessed One; if unobstructed knowledge did not have all things as its object, then where it did not operate, there would be the existence of obstruction, and thus it would not be unobstructed. Or else, let unobstructed knowledge be different from omniscience; but here, omniscience itself is intended by "unobstructed knowledge" because of its unimpeded activity everywhere. And by the attainment of that, the Blessed One is called omniscient, all-knowing, and perfectly enlightened, not because he understood all things at once. And so it is said in the Paṭisambhidāmagga: "This is the ultimate true designation for the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, at the foot of the Bodhi tree, with the attainment of omniscience, namely, 'Buddha'." For by the attainment of knowledge capable of understanding all things, in the Blessed One's continuum... he was not able to penetrate all phenomena without remainder. Here it is asked: Does this knowledge, when it arises, arise in all objects at once, or in succession? And what here? If it arises in all objects at once, then there would be no distinct comprehension of conditioned phenomena, divided into past, future, present, internal, external, and so on, and of unconditioned and conventional phenomena, when they are presented together, as if one were looking at a distant canvas. In that case, it would follow that all phenomena are objects of the Buddha's knowledge in an undifferentiated form, just as those who discern "all phenomena are non-self" see them in the aspect of non-self. Even for those who say: "The knowledge of the Buddhas operates at all times, without conceptualization, on the established characteristics of all knowable phenomena; therefore, they are called omniscient, and thus, the saying 'the elephant, walking, is concentrated, standing, is also concentrated' is well-spoken," the aforementioned fault is not overcome. And because past, future, and conventional phenomena do not have established characteristics as their object, the Buddha's knowledge would be limited to a part. Therefore, it is not appropriate to say that knowledge arises at once. Then, does knowledge arise in all objects in succession? This too is not appropriate. For if knowable things, which are of many kinds due to birth, plane, nature, and so on, and due to direction, place, time, and so on, are grasped in succession, their penetration without remainder is not possible, because the knowable is infinite. As for those who say: "The Blessed One is omniscient because, by directly perceiving a part of the knowable due to the non-deception of the meaning, and then determining the rest by assuming 'it is likewise,' that knowledge is not inferential knowledge, because there is no doubt. For inferential knowledge in the world is associated with doubt," their statement is also not suitable. For if everything is not directly perceived, it is impossible to determine the rest by assuming 'it is likewise' after directly perceiving a part of the knowable due to the non-deception of the meaning. For that 'rest' is not directly perceived. And then, is it not the case that even that direct perception would not be its remaining state? All this is without reason. Why? Because it is a consideration beyond its scope. For it has been said by the Blessed One: "The range of a Buddha, monks, is inconceivable, it should not be conceived. Whoever conceives it would be a partaker of madness and vexation." Herein is the conclusion: whatever the Blessed One wishes to know, whether entirely or in part, in each instance, knowledge proceeds directly, unimpeded, and with constant concentration, due to the absence of distraction. And if the entirety of what is wished to be known were beyond his scope, then its dependence on his wish would not be; rather, it must be wished for, as it is said: "All phenomena are bound by the Buddha's attention, bound by his wish, bound by his advertence, bound by his thought-arising." Even the Blessed One's knowledge of past and future objects is direct perception, being free from inference, tradition, and speculative grasping. But in this case too, when the entirety is wished to be known, would not the knowledge of the Blessed One proceed at once, encompassing all objects in an undifferentiated manner, and thus the aforementioned fault would not be overcome? No, because it has been clarified. For that range of a Buddha is indeed clarified as inconceivable. Otherwise, the inconceivability of the knowledge of the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, would not exist, being similar to the knowledge of ordinary people. Therefore, even though it has all phenomena as its object, it proceeds by making those phenomena well-defined, as if they were a single object. This is what is inconceivable here: "As much as is knowable, so much is knowledge. As much as is knowledge, so much is knowable. Knowledge is bounded by the knowable, the knowable is bounded by knowledge." Thus, being a Perfectly Self-Enlightened One, he has rightly and by himself understood all phenomena, whether simultaneously, separately, at once, or in sequence, according to his wish. Here, "Vijjā" (knowledge) means "it finds what is to be found," that is, it is attained as it truly is. Or "Vijjā" means "it pierces its own opponent," such as the mass of darkness, etc. This means, in the sense of splitting the foot. For this very reason, it is also called knowledge (vijjā) in the sense of making one's sphere known. "Endowed" means possessed of, or complete, or perfect. "Therein" refers to the Ambaṭṭha Sutta. Regarding "mind-made power" (manomayiddhi), the power that arises in the manner described here: "Here, a bhikkhu creates from this body another body, having form, mind-made, complete in all its limbs and parts, with perfect faculties" (Dī. Ni. 1.236), is called mind-made power because it arises through the creation of a mind-made body, which is produced within one's own body by means of the mind of jhāna. The six supernormal powers (abhiññā) are the five supernormal powers such as the power of psychic abilities, together with the knowledge of the destruction of defilements. The inclusion of three or eight kinds of knowledge in various suttas should be understood as being due to the disposition of the trainees. The seven good qualities (saddhammā) are faith, shame, fear of wrongdoing, extensive learning, energy, mindfulness, and wisdom. Concerning these, it is said: "Here, a bhikkhu is faithful, has shame, has fear of wrongdoing, is extensively learned, has aroused energy, has established mindfulness, and is wise" (Dī. Ni. 3.330). The four jhānas are any of the four rūpāvacara jhānas. To address the question, "Why are only these fifteen, beginning with virtue, called 'conduct' (caraṇa) here?", he says, "Because these very ones," and so on.