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B020302Sammohavinodanī aṭṭhakathā(removing delusion commentary)

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However, the five aggregates of clinging in every way are both suffering and a noble truth, apart from craving. States associated with the path and the fruits of recluseship, for whose full understanding the spiritual life is lived in the Blessed One, are neither suffering nor a noble truth. Thus, having connected them appropriately in the origin and so on as well, the decision ‘from the tetrad’ here should be understood. ‘By emptiness, suchness, mode, etc.’: here, first, by emptiness, truly, all the truths are to be understood as empty in the ultimate sense, due to the absence of a feeler, a doer, one who goes to cessation, and one who attains. Therefore, this is said: Only suffering exists, no one is afflicted; a doer is not found, only the doing; Cessation exists, no person is extinguished; the path exists, no attainer is found. Or else: Empty of permanence, beauty, and pleasure, the first pair is empty of self, the deathless state; Devoid of permanence, pleasure, and self, is the path; thus, by emptiness in these. Or the three are empty of cessation, and cessation is empty of the remaining three. Or here, the result is empty of the cause in the origin, due to the absence of suffering, and in the path, of cessation, not being in the same womb as the result, like the primal matter of the naturalists. And the result is empty of the cause, due to the non-inherence of suffering and origin, and of cessation and path, not being inherent in the cause, like the cause-result of those who assert cause-result inherence, such as dyads and so on. Therefore, this is said: This triad here is empty of cessation, that By whatever means, it is emptiness, cessation. Empty is the fruit by the cause, and empty is the cause by the fruit. Thus, the analysis of 'emptiness' should be understood. 'By one kind, etc.' Here, all suffering is of one kind in terms of its continuous nature; of two kinds in terms of name and form; of three kinds in terms of the distinction of the realms of desire, form, and formlessness; of four kinds in terms of the distinction of the four nutriments; of five kinds in terms of the distinction of the five aggregates of clinging. Origin, too, is of one kind in terms of its causative nature; of two kinds in terms of being associated or unassociated with views; of three kinds in terms of the distinction of craving for sensual pleasure, craving for existence, and craving for non-existence; of four kinds in terms of what is to be abandoned by the four paths; of five kinds in terms of the distinction of delighting in forms, etc.; of six kinds in terms of the distinction of the six bodies of craving. Cessation, too, is of one kind in terms of its unconditioned element; but by way of distinction, it is of two kinds in terms of cessation with residue and cessation without residue; of three kinds in terms of the subsiding of the three realms of existence; of four kinds in terms of what is to be attained by the four paths; of five kinds in terms of the subsiding of the five kinds of delight; of six kinds in terms of the destruction of the six bodies of craving. The path, too, is of one kind in terms of what is to be developed; of two kinds in terms of serenity and insight, or in terms of vision and development; of three kinds in terms of the distinction of the three aggregates. For this, being with a basis, like a city, is encompassed by the three aggregates that are without a basis, like a rope. As it was said: "It is not, friend Visākha, that the three aggregates are encompassed by the noble eightfold path. But it is, friend Visākha, that the noble eightfold path is encompassed by the three aggregates. That which, friend Visākha, is right speech, and that which is right action, and that which is right livelihood – these qualities are encompassed in the aggregate of morality; that which, friend Visākha, is right effort, and that which is right mindfulness, and that which is right concentration – these qualities are encompassed in the aggregate of concentration; that which, friend Visākha, is right view, and that which is right thought – these qualities are encompassed in the aggregate of wisdom" (M. i. 462). Here, right speech, etc., are morality itself. Therefore, they are encompassed by the aggregate of morality due to their shared nature. Although in the text the designation 'aggregate of morality' is made in a general sense, the meaning should be understood only in terms of the function. But among right effort and the others, concentration cannot, by its own nature, apply itself to the object with singleness of mind. But it can, having received help from effort accomplishing the function of exertion, and from mindfulness accomplishing the function of non-wavering. Here is an analogy: Just as among three friends who have entered a garden intending to play at the constellations, one, seeing a fully blossomed champak tree, though raising his hand, would not be able to grasp it. Then the second would bend down and offer his back. Even standing on his back, he would not be able to grasp it while trembling. Then the other would offer his shoulder. Standing on one's back and leaning on one's shoulder, he would pluck flowers as he pleases, adorn himself, and play at the constellations. This should be seen in this way. For, like three friends who have entered a garden together, so are the three qualities, right effort and the others, born together; like a fully blossomed champak tree is the object; like one unable to grasp it even raising his hand, so is concentration unable, by its own nature, to apply itself to the object with singleness of mind; like the friend bending down offering his back is effort; like the friend standing offering his shoulder is mindfulness. Just as, among them, standing on one's back and leaning on one's shoulder, the other is able to grasp the flower as he pleases, just so, concentration, having received help from effort accomplishing the function of exertion, and from mindfulness accomplishing the function of non-wavering, is able to apply itself to the object with singleness of mind. Therefore, concentration alone here is included in the concentration group by way of similarity of nature. But effort and mindfulness are included by way of function. Also, in right view and right thought, wisdom cannot, by its own nature, determine the object as 'impermanent, suffering, not-self,' but it can when thought repeatedly strikes and presents it. How? Just as a goldsmith, holding a coin in his hand, though wishing to examine it in all its parts, is unable to turn it with his eye alone, but with the joints of his fingers, Just as one can look here and there, twisting and turning an object; so too, wisdom, by its own nature, cannot determine an object as impermanent, etc. But with the characteristic of directing, with the function of striking and encompassing, like a thought striking and turning, it can determine only what has already been given, taking it up again and again. Therefore, here too, right view is included in the aggregate of wisdom by its nature, but right thought is included by its function. Thus, the path is included in these three aggregates. Hence it was said: "Threefold, by division into aggregates." Fourfold, as the path of stream-entry, etc. Moreover, all truths are of one kind, in that they are not false or are to be known; of two kinds, mundane and supramundane, conditioned and unconditioned; of three kinds, as to be abandoned by seeing, to be abandoned by development, and neither to be abandoned nor not to be abandoned; of four kinds, by the distinction of being fully understood, etc. Thus, here, the determination should be understood by "of one kind, etc." "By similarity and dissimilarity": all truths are similar to each other, in that they are not false, empty of self, and difficult to penetrate. As he said: "What do you think, Ānanda, which is more difficult or harder to comprehend: to shoot an arrow through a fine keyhole from afar, point to point, without missing, or to pierce the tip of a hair split into seven?" "This, venerable sir, is more difficult and harder to comprehend: to pierce the tip of a hair split into seven." "Then, Ānanda, those who understand this with difficulty understand more difficultly, who understand as it really is, 'This is suffering'... ...who understand as it really is, 'This is the path leading to the cessation of suffering.'" (SN 5.1115) They are dissimilar by the arrangement of their own characteristics. The first two are similar, in that they are profound, difficult to fathom, mundane, and subject to defilements; they are dissimilar By difference of fruit and cause, And by what should be known and abandoned. The last two are similar In being profound, hard to fathom, Transcendent, and unconditioned, Dissimilar in object and subject, And in what should be realized and developed. The first and third are also similar In pointing to the fruit, Dissimilar in the conditioned and unconditioned. The second and fourth are also similar In pointing to the cause, Dissimilar in the exclusively wholesome and unwholesome. The first and fourth are also similar In being conditioned, Dissimilar in the mundane and transcendent. The second and third are also similar In the state of neither trainee nor non-trainee, Dissimilar in having an object and not having an object. Thus, in these ways, And by these methods, the wise one Should discern the similarities and dissimilarities Of the Noble Truths. The explanation of the outline of the Suttanta exposition is finished. 1. Explanation of the Exposition of the Truth of Suffering Exposition of Birth 190. Now, to show the briefly outlined suffering, etc., by distinguishing them, this is the section on the exposition, "Which suffering is the Noble Truth of Suffering? Birth is suffering.