English
" Here, the abandonment of form is also stated. Therefore, this is not a reason. No, because it is stated differently. For in that sutta, "Whatever, monks, is the removal of desire and lust for form, that is abandonment there," Thus, the abandonment of form is stated in terms of the removal of desire and lust, Not as it is stated, "Having abandoned six things, having abandoned the five hindrances," Thus, it is stated that it should be abandoned, but it is stated differently, form is not torpor. Therefore, whatever suttas are stated, such as, "Having abandoned these five hindrances, the defilements of the mind," By these and other suttas, it should be understood that only the immaterial is torpor. Thus: "These five, monks, are coverings, hindrances, which overwhelm the mind, weaken wisdom. Which five? Sensual desire, monks, is a covering, a hindrance… …Torpor and sloth, monks, is a covering, a hindrance, which overwhelms the mind, weakens wisdom," And, "The hindrance of torpor and sloth, monks, is blinding, making one without vision, causing ignorance, obstructing wisdom, siding with destruction, leading to non-Nibbana," And, "Even so, brahmin, at whatever time one dwells with a mind overwhelmed by torpor and sloth, overcome by torpor and sloth," And, "For one who attends unwisely, unarisen sensual desire arises… …unarisen torpor and sloth arise," And, "This is a great heap of unwholesomeness, monks, namely, the five hindrances," And many other suttas such as these are stated, which only illuminate its immaterial nature. And because this is immaterial, therefore it arises even in the immaterial realms. That is explained in detail in the Great Treatise, in the section on conditions: "A defilement arises conditioned by a defilement, not by the prenascent condition." In its analysis: "Conditioned by the desire for sensual pleasures in the immaterial realm, sloth and torpor arise... Distraction and ignorance." Everything should be expanded upon in detail. Therefore, the conclusion to be reached here is that sloth and torpor exist only in the immaterial realm. 1166. In the section on remorse, "regarding what is unlawful as lawful," etc., are stated to show the root of remorse. For when an offense is committed with such a perception, when the matter is concluded, the object of the offense is finished, even if mindfulness arises again, thinking, "I have done wrong," it arises due to subsequent regret. Therefore, to show that root, "regarding what is unlawful as lawful," etc., is stated. There, one consumes unlawful food, perceiving it as lawful, one eats unlawful meat, perceiving it as lawful meat, such as eating bear meat, thinking it is pork, or eating leopard meat, thinking it is deer meat; when the time has passed, with the perception of time, after inviting, with the perception of not inviting, when dust has fallen into the bowl, with the perception of accepting it, one eats— thus, one commits a transgression "regarding what is unlawful with the perception of lawful." But one who eats pork, perceiving it as bear meat, and eats at the wrong time, perceiving it as the right time, commits a transgression "regarding what is lawful with the perception of unlawful." Furthermore, one who does something blameless with the perception of blame, and something blameworthy with the perception of blamelessness, commits a transgression "regarding what is blameless with the perception of blame, and what is blameworthy with the perception of blamelessness." Since this arises even when a transgression is committed regarding what is blameless with the perception of blame, thinking, "I have not done good, I have not done merit, I have not done what protects from fear, I have done evil, I have done cruelty, I have done wickedness," therefore, allowing for another object of remorse, he said, "whatever is of such a nature," etc. There, the word "remorse" has the meaning already stated. The way of accumulating remorse is the accumulation of remorse. The state of being accumulated by remorse is the state of being accumulated by remorse. "Mental distress" means that Regret is called "remorse," the turning of the mind towards what is blameworthy or blameless. Because one does not undo a past evil, or do a good deed left undone, it is a "bad" or "despicable" turning, hence "remorse." But it is "remorse of the mind," to show it is of the mind, not of a being. This is its definition by nature. But arising worry, like a rasp on a bronze bowl, arises scratching the mind, therefore it is called "scratching of the mind." This is its definition by function. But that worry which arose in the Vinaya, "Then venerable Sāriputta, having dwelt near what the Blessed One had forbidden, worried about eating alms food from the dwelling," that worry is not a hindrance. For an arahant does not have remorse, thinking, "I have done this badly." But this is a semblance of a hindrance, called Vinaya-worry, which is considering, "Is it allowable? Is it not allowable?" 1176. In the definition of the phrase, "Which things are hindrances and associated with hindrances?" Since sloth and torpor do not separate from each other, therefore the hindrance of sloth and torpor, with the hindrance of ignorance, is spoken of as both a hindrance and associated with a hindrance, without dividing them. But since even with agitation, there is no worry, and agitation arises without worry, therefore it is spoken of divided. And what does not go into association with what, should be understood as not joined. These hindrances, however, are fit to be gathered by way of defilements, and also by way of the path. By way of defilements, sensual desire and ill-will are abandoned by the path of non-returning, sloth, torpor, and agitation by the path of arahantship, worry and doubt by the path of stream-entry, ignorance by the path of arahantship. By way of the path, worry and doubt are abandoned by the path of stream-entry, sensual desire and ill-will by the path of non-returning, sloth, torpor, agitation, and ignorance by the path of arahantship. 1182. In the group of grasping, those things... "Apetva" is plural due to the question's nature. 1219. In the explanation of clinging, "kāmaṃ upādiyatīti kāmupādānaṃ," meaning clinging to objects of desire is kāma-upādāna. Or, "kāmo ca so upādānañcātipi kāmupādānaṃ," desire itself is also clinging, hence kāma-upādāna. Upādāna means firm grasping. Here, "upa" has the sense of firmness, as in upāyāsa, upakaṭṭha, etc. Similarly, "diṭṭhi ca sā upādānañcāti diṭṭhupādānaṃ," that view itself is clinging, hence diṭṭhi-upādāna. "Diṭṭhiṃ upādiyatīti diṭṭhupādānaṃ," clinging to a view is diṭṭhi-upādāna. For example, in "Sassato attā ca loko cā" (DN 1.31), the later view clings to the earlier view. Likewise, "sīlabbataṃ upādiyatīti sīlabbatupādānaṃ," clinging to rites and rituals is sīlabbata-upādāna. Or, "sīlabbatañca taṃ upādānañcātipi sīlabbatupādānaṃ," rites and rituals themselves are clinging, hence sīlabbata-upādāna. For example, cow-vows and goat-vows are themselves clinging due to the conviction "this is purification." Similarly, "vadanti etenāti 'vādo'; upādiyanti etenāti 'upādānaṃ'," that by which they speak is "vādo," that by which they cling is "upādāna." What do they speak, or cling to? The self. "Attano vādupādānaṃ attavādupādānaṃ"; "attavādamattameva vā attā"ti upādiyanti etenāti attavādupādānaṃ, that by which they cling to the mere assertion of self as the self is attavāda-upādāna. 1220. "Yo kāmesu kāmacchando," here too, material desires are intended as "kāma" without exception. Therefore, desire for material objects is here kāma-upādāna, even for a non-returner. However, he has no sensual lust based on the five strands of sense pleasure. 1221. In the explanation of diṭṭhi-upādāna, "natthi dinnanti," there is no giving. He knows that giving exists, that it is possible to give something to someone; but he believes that there is no fruit or result of giving. "Natthi yiṭṭhanti," yiṭṭha means a great sacrifice. He knows that it is possible to perform such a sacrifice; but he believes that there is no fruit or result of sacrifice. "Natthi hutanti," offering, hospitality, auspicious acts. He knows that it is possible to do that; but he believes that there is no fruit or result of that. "Natthi, sukatadukkaṭānanti," here, the ten wholesome courses of action are called wholesome deeds. The ten unwholesome courses of action are called unwholesome deeds. He knows of their existence, but he believes that there is no fruit or result. "Natthi ayaṃ lokoti," he believes that this world, where he is situated in the next world, does not exist. There is no other world, thus standing in this world, he assumes there is no other world. There is no mother, there is no father, he knows the existence of mother and father, he assumes that due to actions done to them, there is no result, no consequence. There are no beings spontaneously born, he assumes there are no beings who arise by passing away and spontaneous birth. There are no ascetics and brahmins who have attained right practice, who practice the path in accordance with the Dhamma, he assumes there are no such ones in the world. Those who, by their own direct knowledge, having realized this world and the other world, proclaim it, he assumes there is no all-knowing Buddha capable of knowing and proclaiming this world and the other world by his own superior knowledge. Now, these attachments can be brought forth in the order of defilements, and also in the order of the path. In the order of defilements, sense-attachment is abandoned by the four paths, the remaining three by the path of stream-entry. In the order of the path, the path of stream-entry abandons attachment to views, etc., the four paths abandon sense-attachment. 1235. In the group of defilements, defilements are indeed the objects of defilements.