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and he incurs an anantarīya kamma (deed with immediate result), and he commits a pārājika (defeat). If some other stranger is lying there, and he kills him, thinking, "I will kill the sheep," he is a killer, and he commits a pārājika, but he does not incur an anantarīya kamma. If a yakkha or a peta is lying there, and he kills it, thinking, "I will kill the sheep," he is only a killer, and he does not incur an anantarīya kamma, and he does not commit a pārājika, but it is a thullaccaya (grave offense). If no one else is lying there, but it is indeed the sheep, and he kills it, he is a killer, and he and incurs a mental offense. ‘‘I will kill one of my mother, father, or Arahant,’’ and kills one of them, he is a killer, he commits an act of immediate retribution, and incurs a major offense. ‘‘I will kill one of them,’’ and kills another stranger, or kills a yakkha or a peta, or kills a goat, it should be understood in the manner stated before. Here, however, the intention is cruel. Other cases like a heap of straw should also be understood here. If one, ‘‘I will ask for a bloody sword or spear,’’ thrusts it into a heap of straw, and kills his mother or father or an Arahant or a stranger or a yakkha or a peta or an animal lying there, he is called a ‘‘killer’’ by convention; but due to the absence of an intention to kill, he neither commits an act of retribution, nor incurs an offense. But if one, thrusting it in this way, notices the bodily contact, and thinking, ‘‘A being is inside, let it die,’’ thrusts it in and kills, for him, an act of retribution and an offense should be understood, corresponding to those beings. The same method applies to one who thrusts it in to hide it there, or one who throws it into thickets or bushes. If one, ‘‘I will kill a thief,’’ kills his father who is walking in the guise of a thief, he commits an act of immediate retribution, and incurs a major offense. But if one, seeing another warrior and his father performing an act in an enemy army, shoots an arrow at the warrior, thinking, ‘‘Having pierced him, it will pierce my father,’’ and it goes according to his intention, he is a patricide. If he shoots, thinking, ‘‘When the warrior is pierced, my father will escape,’’ and the arrow goes contrary to his intention and kills his father, he is called a ‘‘patricide’’ by convention; but there is no act of immediate retribution. ‘‘Having stood by’’ means standing nearby. ‘‘Commands’’ means commands specifically or non-specifically. When an enemy army is present, if one commands non-specifically, ‘‘Pierce thus, strike thus, kill thus,’’ as many as the commanded person kills, so many are the acts of killing for both. If there, If the parents are the one who orders, it touches immediate karma. If the parents are the one who is ordered, that one touches immediate karma. If it is an Arahant, both touch immediate karma. But if, having pointed out, "This one, tall, short, with a red cloak, with a blue cloak, seated on an elephant's shoulder, seated in the middle, pierce, strike, kill him!" is ordered, if he kills that very one, for both there is destruction of life; and in the case of an immediate karma object, there is immediate karma. If he kills another, for the one who ordered, there is no destruction of life. By this, the method of ordering is stated. Herein – The object, and the time, and the place, the weapon, the posture; Having weighed these five points, the discerning one should grasp the meaning. Another method – The object, the time, and the place, the weapon, the posture; And the specific action – these, are the six regulators of an order. Herein, "object" means the being to be killed. "Time" means the time like morning or evening, and the time like youth or old age. "Place" means a village or a forest, or a house door or the middle of a house, or a street or a crossroads, and so on. "Weapon" means a sword or an arrow, or a spear, and so on. "Posture" means the movement or sitting of the one to be killed, and so on. "Specific action" means piercing or cutting, or breaking or crushing the skull, and so on. If indeed, having deviated from the object, one is ordered "Kill that one," and then kills another; or is ordered "Strike and kill from the front," and strikes and kills from behind, or from the side, or in another place; for the one who ordered, there is no karmic bond; for the one who was ordered, there is karmic bond. But if, without deviating from the object, one kills as ordered, for the one who ordered, at the moment of ordering, and for the one who was ordered, at the moment of killing, for both there is karmic bond. And here, by the specific object, there is specific karma and specific offense. Thus, in the case of the object, the agreement and disagreement should be understood. But as for time, if one, not specifying "today or tomorrow," is ordered "Kill in the morning," whenever... Kills in the forenoon, there is no deviation. But if one, told "this forenoon today," kills at noon or in the evening or in the forenoon tomorrow, there is a deviation. The one who ordered has no karmic bond. Even if one attempts to kill in the forenoon and noon arrives, the same principle applies. By this principle, agreement and deviation in all time divisions should be understood. Regarding place, if one is ordered "kill this one in the village" without specification, and kills him anywhere, there is no deviation. But if one is ordered "only in the village" and kills in the forest, or ordered "in the forest" and kills in the village, or ordered "at the house door" and kills in the middle of the house, there is a deviation. By this principle, agreement and deviation in all place divisions should be understood. Regarding weapon, if one is ordered "kill with a weapon" without specifying "with a sword or an arrow," and kills with any weapon, there is no deviation. But if one is told "with a sword" and uses an arrow, or told "with this sword" and uses another sword, or if told "with this edge" of that very sword, and kills with the other edge, or with the flat, or with the hilt, or with the scabbard, there is a deviation. By this principle, agreement and deviation in all weapon divisions should be understood. Regarding posture, if one says "kill this one while walking," and the ordered one kills him while walking, there is no deviation. But if told "kill him only while walking" and kills him while sitting, or told "kill him only while sitting" and kills him while walking, there is a deviation. By this principle, agreement and deviation in all posture divisions should be understood. Regarding specific action, if one is told "kill by piercing" and kills by piercing, there is no deviation. But if one is told "kill by piercing" and kills by cutting, there is a deviation. By this principle, agreement and deviation in all specific action divisions should be understood. But if, regarding characteristics, one is ordered "kill the tall, the short, the dark, the fair, the thin, the fat" without specifying, He commands, and the one commanded kills anyone similar, there is no doubt, for both it is a pārājika. But if he commands intending himself, and the one commanded, thinking "this is he," kills the commander himself, for the commander it is a dukkaṭa, for the killer it is a pārājika. The commander commands intending himself, the other kills someone else similar, the commander is freed, only for the killer it is a pārājika. Why? Because the place is not specified. But if, even when commanding intending himself, he specifies the place, saying "kill such a person sitting in such and such a night-place or day-place, or on the elder's seat, or the new monk's seat, or the middle monk's seat." And if another is sitting there, if the commanded one kills him, neither the killer is freed nor the commander. Why? Because the place is specified. But if he kills elsewhere than the specified place, the commander is freed – this method is stated very firmly in the Mahāaṭṭhakathā. Therefore here no disrespect should be shown. Thus, "by intending" – in the manner of the matrix, the discourse on the application of command is concluded. Now, to show the explanation of the matrix term "who by a messenger," the four cases beginning with "a bhikkhu commands a bhikkhu" are stated. Among these, "he, thinking him" means that commanded one who was named "such-and-such" by the commander, thinking him to be that person, deprives that very person of life, for both it is a pārājika. "Thinking him, another" means the one who was told "deprive him of life," thinking him to be that person, deprives another similar person of life, for the original instigator there is no offense. "Thinking another, him" means the one who was told by the commander, seeing his strong companion standing nearby, thinking "by the strength of this one, he roars; let me first deprive this one of life," while striking, turning to the other, who was standing in that place, thinking "it is the companion," deprives him of life, for both it is a pārājika. "Thinking another, another" means in the same way as before, thinking "let me first deprive his companion of life," he deprives the companion himself of life, for him alone it is a pārājika. The end of the messenger section. In the section on instructing another, in cases like "tell so-and-so," one teacher and three disciples named Buddharakkhita, Dhammarakkhita, and Saṅgharakkhita are to be understood. There, regarding "a monk orders a monk," the teacher, wishing to have someone killed, having explained the matter, orders Buddharakkhita. "Tell so-and-so" means: "Go you, Buddharakkhita, tell this matter to Dhammarakkhita." "So-and-so is to tell so-and-so" means: "Dhammarakkhita is also to tell Saṅgharakkhita." "So-and-so is to deprive so-and-so of life" means: Thus, Saṅgharakkhita, ordered by Dhammarakkhita, who was ordered by you, is to deprive that person of life.