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or "realized by me" is indeed a defeat. Why? Because Nibbana is inherently supramundane. Similarly, saying "I have penetrated the Four Noble Truths, they have been penetrated by me" is also a defeat. Why? For the penetration of the Truths is indeed a synonym for the Path. But since it is said in the Vibhanga (Vibh. 746): "The three analytical knowledges (paṭisambhidā) arise from mundane wholesome states in the four consciousnesses associated with knowledge; they arise from functional states in the four consciousnesses associated with knowledge; and the analytical knowledge of meaning (atthapaṭisambhidā) arises in these, and also in the four paths and the four fruits." Therefore, saying "I have gained the analytical knowledge of Dhamma" or "of language... ...of ready wit" or "I have gained the mundane analytical knowledge of meaning" is also not a defeat. When "I have gained the analytical knowledges" is said, it does not immediately lead to a defeat. But when "I have gained the supramundane analytical knowledge of meaning" is said, then it is a defeat. However, in the Saṅkhepaṭṭhakathā, it is stated that even saying "I have attained the analytical knowledge of meaning" without qualification is a defeat. Even in the Undi, it is said, "he is not freed." But in the Great Commentary, because it is reasoned, "By this much there is no pārājika, by this much the head does not descend, by this much it is not pārājika," it is not possible to make another standard. Even for one who says, "I enter the attainment of cessation," or "I am an obtainer of that," there is no pārājika. Why? Because the attainment of cessation is neither worldly nor supramundane. But if he thinks thus: "An anāgāmī or an arahant enters cessation, they will know me as one of them," and he declares it, and they know him as such, then it is pārājika, as stated in the Great Paccari and Saṅkhepa Commentaries. That should be investigated and taken. Even for one who says, "In a past existence, during the time of Kassapa Sammāsambuddha, I was a stream-enterer," there is no pārājika. For by referring to past aggregates, the head does not descend. But in the Saṅkhepa Commentary, it is said that "for one who says, 'In the past I was an obtainer of the eight attainments,' there is no pārājika, because it is of a nature to be shaken; but here, some say, 'it is of an unshakable nature.'" That too is rejected there, saying, "For one who speaks referring to a past existence, there is no pārājika; it is only for one who speaks referring to the present existence." Elucidation of the Chapter on Purity. 200. Having thus elaborated the ten mātikā-terms such as jhāna, now, in order to show the manner of boasting and the types of offenses, by binding the 'wheel-refrain' in the manner of its own elaboration, and by showing the factors of the intentional falsehood that one utters when boasting of a superhuman state, he begins with "in three ways." Therein, the Chapter on Purity, the Chapter on Desiring to Speak, and the Chapter Connected with Requisites are the three great chapters. In these, in the Chapter on Purity, starting with the first jhāna up to the term "mind free from delusion and hindrances," in each single term, one term from these six terms— "I attained," "I attain," "I am attained," "I am an obtainer," "I am master," "it is realized by me"— is to be understood in three ways, four ways, five ways, six... Indeed, "by seven modes," thus, having combined five times, the method called Suddhika is declared. Thence, by joining each and every term with the first jhāna, such as "the first jhāna, and the second jhāna," having joined all terms with that same elaboration, the method called Khaṇḍacakka is declared. Indeed, having brought that back again, it is not joined with the first jhāna and so on; therefore it is called 'Khaṇḍacakka'. Thence, having joined each and every term with the second jhāna, such as "the second jhāna, and the third jhāna," having brought it back again, and connected it with the first jhāna, with that same elaboration, the method called Baddhacakka is declared. Thence, just as with the second jhāna, so also with the third jhāna and so on, having joined each and every term, having brought it back again, and connected it with the second jhāna and so on, with that same elaboration, and having stated twenty-nine other Baddhacakkas, the method of the single root (Ekamūlaka) is concluded. But the text is shown in brief; it should be understood in detail by one who is not confused. And just as the Ekamūlaka, so also the Dumūlaka and so on, up to the end of all roots, four hundred and thirty-five methods are declared. Namely – the twenty-nine of two roots, the twenty-eight of three roots, the twenty-seven of four roots; thus also the five roots and so on, making each one less, should be understood up to the thirty roots. But in the text, having abbreviated even their names, saying 'this is the method of all roots,' one method of thirty roots is shown. And because the term 'empty dwelling' is not joined with jhāna, and the main heading does not apply, therefore, not referring to that, the application is shown everywhere only up to the term 'mind free from hindrances,' due to mental delusion, thus it should be understood. Thus, for one who speaks of the first jhāna and so on, either in direct order or in reverse order, either having joined with the second jhāna and so on or not having joined, in the manner of 'they enter' and so on, there is no liberation; he incurs a pārājika offense, indeed. And in this great chapter on Suddhika, which has been stated in the way of showing this meaning, this is a brief explanation of the meaning – "by three modes," thus, having combined... By three reasons that are factors of intentional false speech. "It is for him beforehand" means in the prior part itself for that person it is thus: "I will speak falsely." "It is for him speaking" means it is for him while speaking. "It is for him having spoken" means it is for him when spoken, when what was to be said is said; this is the meaning. Or else, "for him having spoken" means for one who has spoken, for one whose speech is finished, it is. Whoever thus knows even beforehand, knows even while speaking, knows even afterwards, "I have spoken falsely," that person, saying "I have attained the first jhāna," incurs a pārājika offence; this meaning is shown here. Although it is shown, yet there is this distinction here – first there is a question: "The prior part 'I will speak falsely' exists, but the latter part 'I have spoken falsely' does not exist. For someone might forget what was just said. Is a pārājika incurred by him, or not?" That is thus answered in the commentaries: when one knows in the prior part "I will speak falsely," and knows while speaking "I am speaking falsely," it is not possible for "I have spoken falsely" not to be in the latter part. Even if it is not, it is still a pārājika. For the first two factors alone are sufficient. For whom even there is no intention beforehand "I will speak falsely," but while speaking he knows "I am speaking falsely," and even after speaking he knows "I have spoken falsely," that person should not be made to incur an offence. For the prior part is more decisive. If that is absent, it is spoken by mistake, or spoken in jest. And here, "that knowing" and "the combination of knowings" should be abandoned. "That knowing" should be abandoned means that by which mind one knows "I will speak falsely," by that same mind one knows "I am speaking falsely," and knows "I have spoken falsely" – that thus by one single mind one knows in three moments – this "that knowing" should be abandoned. For it is not possible for that same mind to know that mind, just as it is not possible for that same sword to cut that sword. But each preceding mind for each succeeding mind thus... becomes a condition for attainment and ceases. Therefore it is said: The measure is just the prior part, when that is, it will not be; The remaining two are not there, the measure of speech is three-limbed. "The combination of knowledge should be abandoned" – these three states of mind should not be taken as arising at one moment. For this mind is called: When the first has not ceased, the last does not arise; Because of continuous arising, it appears as one. Furthermore, when someone knowingly speaks a falsehood, saying, "I attained the first jhāna," because he holds the view, "I do not have the first jhāna," indeed, this is his belief. Similarly, "I do not have the first jhāna" is what he accepts and what he likes. And his mind is of such a nature: "I do not have the first jhāna." But when he wishes to speak a falsehood, then, having set aside, put away, concealed, and made unreal that view, or the acceptance along with the view, or the liking along with the view and acceptance, or the state of mind along with the view, acceptance, and liking, he speaks. Therefore, to show the distinction of factors even in their regard, "in four ways" and so on was stated. And since in the Parivāra it is said, "False speech is eight-limbed" (Paṭi. 328), another method, "in eight ways," should be applied here, along with the perception intended there. And here, "having set aside the view" is said with reference to setting aside the strongest mental factor. "Having set aside acceptance" and so on are said with reference to setting aside progressively weaker ones. "Having set aside perception" here refers to setting aside the weakest of all mental factors. For it is not possible that one would speak a knowing falsehood without even setting aside perception. But since a monastic offense (pārājika) does not occur with future tense words like "I will attain," therefore, it should be understood that only past and present tense words like "I attained" are stated in the text. 207. Furthermore, everything in this great section on purity is clear in meaning.