Chinese
无论什么都好，对于“有情”和“我”的称谓，以身心聚合的集合体为对象，认为仅仅是那个集合体，能够独立于身心的状态和各种组成部分之外而存在。由于我执是遍计所执，是从恶劣的宗派中推断出来的，所以在其上还会附加其他的诸多差别。那些错乱的思维所安立的安立之法，从一开始就不存在，这就是人无我。无我唯有在佛教中才宣说。其中，有情、命、补特伽罗、养育者、我等，通常被视为名称的同义词，执着于此也是名称的同义词。细致来说，略有差别，有情等四者可以清晰地显现为六根的对境，而我则仅仅是分别念所安立，除此之外没有其他显现。然而，究竟而言，有情等也不存在，在胜义谛中也不存在这些，仅仅是假立的自性，难道我不存在吗？有什么区别呢？在未经观察分析的情况下，作为业果之所依的我，与有情等相同，仅仅是假立存在而被承认，但是如果按照我执所执着的方式来考虑，更不用说按照我执遍计所执的方式来执着了，即使是按照我执俱生执的方式来执着也是不可能的。这是为什么呢？因为俱生执也执着常一自在的意义。此处，有情、我、命、补特伽罗和养育者等，即使在世间俱生的心识中，也变成我的同义词，因为执着自己和他人为有情。我由父母养育。我养育了马、牛等。死亡时，生命的功能完全停止，我断灭了。像天授一样，认为这个有情不存在了。对于我来说，既有智慧，也有贪欲，也有经典，也有血肉，这是充满的状态。智慧等做这个和那个事情，这是流动的状态，因为认为是补特伽罗的士夫。自己或他人也
English
Whatever it may be, regarding the terms "sentient being" and "I," focusing on the collection of body and mind, it is believed that merely that collection can exist independently from the states and various parts of the body and mind. Since self-grasping is imputational, arising from reasoning within flawed philosophical systems, further distinctions are added upon it. The imputations made by those deluded minds never existed from the beginning, and this is the selflessness of persons. This selflessness is taught only in Buddhism. Here, sentient being, life, person, nourisher, and I are generally presented as synonyms, and grasping at them is also a synonym. In detail, there is a slight difference: the four, sentient being and so on, can clearly appear as objects of the six senses, while I is merely imputed by conceptual thought and does not appear otherwise. However, ultimately, sentient beings and so on do not exist, nor do they exist in ultimate conventional truth. If it is merely an imputation of self-nature, then does the self not exist? What is the difference? In the absence of investigation and analysis, the self as the basis for cause and effect is merely imputed to exist, similar to sentient beings and so on. However, if we consider it according to how self-grasping grasps it, let alone how self-grasping imputes it, it is not even possible according to how innate self-grasping grasps it. Why is that? Because innate self-grasping also grasps the meaning of permanence and independence. Here, sentient being, I, life, person, and nourisher become synonyms for self even in the minds of worldly beings, because they grasp themselves and others as sentient beings. I am nourished by my parents. I nourish horses, cows, and so on. When death occurs, the function of life completely ceases, and I am cut off. Like Devadatta, it is thought that this sentient being no longer exists. For me, there is both wisdom and desire, both scripture and flesh and blood, which is a state of fullness. Wisdom and so on do this and that, which is a state of outflow, because it is thought to be a person, a being. Oneself or others also
Chinese
，思维国王后做了此事，为了解脱而行此苦行。因为也承许有心者。又如果依宗派假立而论，有情和补特伽罗仅仅是，自宗佛教徒中著名的安立方式；命是裸体派等主要著名的安立方式；养育是自在天论者等主要著名的安立方式；我和灵魂是所有外道徒中著名的安立方式。其中，有情的含义是作意者。但那也是不存在的，如果作意者存在于作意之外，不是作意的作意者与作意互相存在，由于一个不能见到另一个的作用，所以不能对作意者的境作意。如果成为因果关系存在，那么一个存在时另一个不存在，作意者怎么能作意呢？如果本体是一个，那么心和作意是无常的，因此作意者也将变成无常，以自己的本体不能成立。此处“作意者”是指作意时，随顺于境的识的通用名称，并不是单指心所作意。所谓命，这又是什么呢？与我成为一体是不行的，因为命有生和灭，而我不能有生和灭。如果成为他体，那么就像身体的肢体等一样，命不是那本身，也不是应该珍爱的。命是寿命、暖和，识所依之物。如是声闻部派的观点也是不行的，如果识所依的处所本身是命，那么除了身体或心之外没有，如果仅仅说识产生和存在的因是所依，那么虽然没有超出所缘缘、增上缘、因缘和等无间缘四缘，但那些任何一个都不能成为命，也不能成为业果的所依。暖和暖的处所不能离开身体。寿命也不能在身体和心的状态之外确定，因此，所谓命也仅仅是假立。所谓补特伽罗，是因还是业的谁，状态
English
Thinking of the king, this action was done. This asceticism is practiced for the sake of liberation. Because it is also accepted that there is a mind. Furthermore, if we consider it in terms of sectarian designation, sentient beings and individuals are merely designations that are well-known among our own Buddhist community. Life is primarily known among the Naked Ascetics and others. Nourishment is primarily known among the Ishvara-speakers. And self is known to all non-Buddhists. Among these, the meaning of sentient being is 'the one who thinks'. But that is not the case, if the thinker exists apart from the thinking, the non-thinking thinker exists mutually with the thinking, because one does not see the action of the other, so one cannot think about the object of the thinker. If they exist as cause and effect, then when one exists, the other does not, so how can the thinker think? If the essence is one, then since mind and thinking are impermanent, the thinker will also become impermanent, and will not be established by his own essence. Here, "thinker" refers to the general name of the consciousness that follows the object when thinking, but it does not refer only to the mental factor of thinking. What is this so-called life? It cannot be one with the self, because life has birth and death, but the self cannot have birth and death. If it becomes other, then like the limbs of the body and so on, life is not that itself, nor is it to be cherished. Life is life, warmth, and the basis of consciousness. Even the view of the Hearer schools is not acceptable, because if the very place on which consciousness depends is life, then there is nothing other than body or mind. If it is said that the cause of the arising and abiding of consciousness is merely the basis, then although it does not go beyond the four conditions of object, lord, cause, and immediately preceding condition, none of these can be life, nor can it be the basis of karmic results. Warmth and the place of warmth cannot be other than the body. Life is also not determined to be other than the state of body and mind, therefore, the so-called life is merely a designation. The so-called person, which of cause or action, state
Chinese
另外，以感受果报的方式产生的遗漏是，就补特伽罗（藏文：གང་ཟག）的意义而言，意思是作者也是他，感受异熟果的也是他。这不行，如果作者就是感受者，那么就会导致在造作的时候就感受异熟果，如果感受者就是作者，那么就会导致在感受果报的时候也在造作那个业。如果既不造作也不感受，但仍然是作者和感受者，那么一切都将变成作者和感受者。因此，补特伽罗也不是实有，仅仅是假立而已。寂天（藏文：ཞི་བ་ལྷ）也说：“依赖于一个相续，被称为作者和受者。” 所谓滋养是什么呢？是食物、住所、用具，还是同类的后代延续前代的相续，这叫做滋养吗？或者是一个作者滋养一个所谓的“我”？如果按照前者，虽然是自宗的观点，但由于各种各样的因产生各种各样的果，仅仅是事物的相续存在，因此安立为滋养者。这并非实有，仅仅是假立而已。如果按照后者，那是不行的，因为那样的所滋养和能滋养二者都是可以显现的，但却无法被量所证知。作者滋养也是不行的，作者本身就是自在的，如果想要存在，那么依靠造作就能存在，不需要滋养。如果需要通过其他方法产生，再通过其他方法存在，那么因为不自在，就不能成为作者。如果“我”是唯一的、不混合的，那么就不能被滋养，因为对方认为事物和作用不会进入其中。即使不进入，但如果可以被滋养，那么就会导致西方的水流滋养东方的庄稼。如果其他的物质和作用混合，那么因为无常和众多，唯一和不混合的“我”也仅仅是衰败的假立而已。同样，所谓的“我”也是不成立的，如果与身心相异，那么就与认为“我”因身心的变化而感受苦乐相违背。如果是一体的，那么身心是无常
English
Furthermore, the outflows that arise from experiencing the results are, in terms of the meaning of a person (Tibetan: gang zag), that the agent is also that, and the one who experiences the ripening results is also that. This is not possible, for if the agent is the same as the experiencer, then it would follow that one experiences the ripening results at the very time of acting. And if the experiencer is the same as the agent, then it would follow that one is also acting that very action at the time of experiencing the results. And if one neither acts nor experiences, but is still the agent and the experiencer, then everything would become agents and experiencers. Therefore, a person is not established as a real entity, but is merely a conceptual imputation. Shantideva also said: "Relying on a single continuum, one is designated as the agent and the enjoyer." What is this called nourishing? Is it food, dwelling, utensils, or the later generation of the same kind continuing the lineage of the former, that is called nourishing? Or does a single agent nourish a single so-called "self"? According to the former, although it is the view of our own school, since various causes produce various results, and only the continuum of things remains, therefore it is designated as the nourisher. This is not real, but is merely established by imputation. According to the latter, it is not possible, because both the nourished and the nourisher are able to appear, but cannot be cognized by valid cognition. It is also not possible for the agent to nourish, since the agent itself is independent, and if it wants to exist, then it depends on acting to exist, and does not need nourishment. If it needs to be produced by other means, and then exist by other means, then because it is not independent, it cannot be the agent. If the "self" is unique and unmixed, then it cannot be nourished, because the opponent believes that things and actions do not enter into it. Even if they do not enter, but if it can be nourished, then it would follow that the stream of water in the west nourishes the crops in the east. If other substances and actions are mixed, then because of impermanence and multiplicity, the unique and unmixed "self" would merely be a designation of decay. Similarly, the so-called "self" is also not established, for if it is different from the body and mind, then it contradicts the belief that the "self" experiences happiness and suffering due to the changes of the body and mind. If it is one, then the body and mind are impermanent.
Chinese
既然不是众多，我也现在必须改变吗？那和认为是常恒和唯一的相违背。如果认为即使不是常恒和众多，也不和“我”相违背，那么那些就是身心等事物本身，和用事物来执著为他者相违背，并且安立“我”这个名称没有必要，以及不能成立为作者和受者，并且因为不能成为实有。这里“无我的法”是指，以无我来区分的法，这是遮止了仅是否定，显示了所否定的法性是存在的。即使我（藏文：ང་，梵文天城体：，梵文罗马拟音：，汉语字面意思：）的自性真实不存在，但是以我执如何安立的安立分，认为是“我”的自性并且傲慢地执著的执著方式的所执分，从有情的自性到我自己的自性之间遮止，因此我（藏文：ང་，梵文天城体：，梵文罗马拟音：，汉语字面意思：）在一切方面都被破斥了。这样一来，遮止了所破的五种自性，在建立方面，世俗中仅仅是安立了业果的所依，胜义中仅仅是法界存在，这个具有六种意义的偈颂广说了人无我。第三是六度波罗蜜多的愿文中，宣说了共同的体性和宣说了不共同的差别。第一是，我执、我所执等等，断绝了我与我所执著的摄取，或者期待回报和异熟等等，对于事物，也就是布施等六者的作者、所作、业这三者中的任何一个，也不以显而易见的执著而安住，而行持六度波罗蜜多。 “执著的”是指，我与我所执著的法，的意思，因此，安住在执著我的法中而行持，不住在执著事物的法中而行持，是这个意思。即使不执著我和事物，但是为了利益一切有情的需求和事业而行持，这是因为被大悲所摄取。 “没有悭吝的布施”是指，为了作为布施的最初的说明而安立，断绝邪淫而修持对治烦恼的戒律，以及断绝不耐烦的变化的安忍，以及断绝懈怠的精进，以及断绝散乱的禅定，以及智慧